Changing gear : driving corporate real estate financing decisions for the agile workplace by Hardy, Trevor J. F. (Trevor John Fraser), 1977-
CHANGING GEAR: DRIVING CORPORATE REAL ESTATE FINANCING DECISIONS FOR THE AGILE WORKPLACE
by
Trevor J.F. Hardy
Bachelor of Building Arts, University of Port Elizabeth, 1997
Bachelor of Architecture, University of Port Elizabeth, 1999
Submitted to the Department of Architecture in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degrees of O
Master of Science in Real Estate Development
Master of Science in Architectural Studies
at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
September, 2002
ChTCHN01I OGY
LABRARII
02002 Trevor J.F. Hardy. All rights reserved
The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and to distribute publicly paper and electronic copies of this thesis document
in whole or in part.
Signature of Author:
Center f69'eal Estate, Department of Architecture
August 2, 2002
- and:
William L. Porter
Professor of Architecture and Planning,
Department of Architecture
Thesis Supervisor
W. Tod McGrath
Lecturer, Department of Urban Studies and Planning
Thesis Supervisor
Accepted by:
g ofessor Julian Beinartof Architecture
Chair, Committee on Graduate Students
William C. Wheaton
Chairman, Interdepartmental Degree
Program in Real Estate Development
Certified by:
and:
CHANGING GEAR: DRIVING CORPORATE REAL ESTATE FINANCING DECISIONS FOR THE AGILE WORKPLACE
by
Trevor J.F. Hardy
Submitted to the Department of Architecture on August 2, 2002 in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degrees of Master of
Science in Real Estate Development and Master of Science in Architectural Studies
ABSTRACT
Given the needs of corporations in the global business environment, corporate real estate investment decisions represent strategic
choices that support a company's overall business strategy. This thesis clearly illustrates that, contrary to the Modigliani Miller
theorem, companies do face real trade-offs in deciding how they finance their real estate investments. Notwithstanding the need to
customize decisions on behalf of the business unit customers and to ensure that these choices are economically sound within a given
region, there are significant factors that drive real estate decision makers to make a particular financing decision. By analyzing these
factors in relation to the financing alternatives available a comprehensive framework of decision drivers is developed to aid CRE
managers in gathering relevant information in order to evaluate the overall effectiveness and trade-offs associated with each
alternative. Through a series of case studies it is then shown that financing decisions which optimize the real estate portfolio 1) clearly
reflect the financial and operational requirements of both the company and business units; 2) are very much part of a larger portfolio
wide corporate real estate strategy, which is closely allied to the company's overall corporate strategy; 3) take into account the
perspectives of other role players (IT,HR, Finance) in the decision making process.
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CHAPTER ONE U
INTRODUCTION
In 1961 Modigliani and Miller published their seminal paper
showing the irrelevance of dividend policy in a world without
taxes, transaction costs, or other market imperfections. The
Modigliani and Miller (M&M) theorem, which was developed
through the 1950's, became a foundation of 'modern finance'.
The key insight of Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller, each
of whom won a Nobel Prize for his work in this area, is that
value is created on the left-hand side of the balance sheet when
companies make good investments - in, say, plant and
equipment or R&D - that ultimately increase the company's
operating cash flows. How companies finance those
investments on the right-hand side of the balance sheet -
whether through debt, equity, or retained earnings - is largely
irrelevant. These decisions about financing policy can affect
only how the value created by a company's real investments is
divided among its investors. In an efficient and well
functioning capital market, they cannot affect the overall value
of those investments. In other words, to paraphrase many
finance theory lecturers:
"financing policy affects only the slicing of the pie and not the
size of the pie itself"
If one accepts this view of M&M, it follows almost as a
corollary that corporate real estate financing strategies are also
of no consequence. They are purely financial transactions that
don't affect the overall value of the company's operating
assets. The bottom line however is that financial markets do
not work as smoothly as M&M envisioned. Over the past two
decades a different view of financial policy has thus emerged:
one that allows a more integral role for financing decisions.
This "postmodern" paradigm accepts as gospel the key insight
of M&M but it goes further by treating financial policy as
critical in enabling companies to make valuable investments.
Most importantly, it recognizes that companies face real trade-
offs in deciding how they finance their investments. Within the
context of corporate real estate, the primary objective of this
investigation is therefore to establish an understanding of what
these trade-offs really are.
The real estate manager has many options as part of the real
estate financial structuring strategy. The financing decision is
also typically made with the primary objective of optimizing
the effectiveness of the workplace portfolio and maximizing
shareholder value. Furthermore, each one of the financing
alternatives has certain features which distinguish it in terms of
its overall impact to the corporation. The objective of this
inquiry is thus threefold:
1. to establish what primary drivers are considered by
corporate real estate managers in selecting the most
appropriate financing strategy.
2. to test the conclusions derived in (1) above through a
series of case studies and be open to the finding of
additional decision drivers.
3. to assess the relative importance placed on each driver
and discuss why.
The supply and demand of these financing alternatives will
vary with the immediate real estate and economic conditions
and as a result, pricing, financial feasibility and overall
workplace impact will vary at any given point in time.
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The establishment of a comprehensive framework of decision
drivers will thus serve to aid CRE managers in gathering
relevant information, evaluating the overall effectiveness and
trade-offs of each alternative (Figure 1).
The real estate manager can then make a sound
recommendation to the business unit with the knowledge that
the solution is acceptable to the marketplace, can provide
flexibility to a dynamic business model and agile workplace
infrastructure at the most reasonable cost.
Using this framework, the CRE manager can routinely
reevaluate the effectiveness of it's real estate assets and thus
optimize the portfolio to give appropriate support to the
primary objective of maximizing shareholder value.
Chapters two and three establish the parameters of both the
economic and organizational context (see figure 1) within
which these financing decisions are made. Chapter four
explores the basic spectrum of financing alternatives which are
available. As a matter of definition, 'financing alternatives'
refers to the full spectrum of real estate procurement
alternatives or contractual arrangements available to a
corporation. The 'financing alternatives' that are explicitly
considered in this thesis are direct corporate funding, leveraged
acquisitions, synthetic leasing, bond net leasing and traditional
NNN operating leases. Chapter five then establishes a
framework of quantitative drivers which influence the
corporate real estate financing decision followed by chapter six
which focuses on the qualitative drivers. The quantitative and
qualitative frameworks are then tested through a series of three
case studies, making up chapters seven, eight and nine. Chapter
ten then closes with the conclusion.
CHAPTER Two U
ECONOMIC CONTEXT
"September 1 1th reinforced a fact of contemporary life.
ours is a period of change and uncertainty - a period in
which dramatic economic developments, acts of man and
the vagaries of nature require us to respond rapidly."
- (MIT/Gartner et al, 2001)
The purpose of this chapter is to establish the nature of the
relationship between workplace assets and the organization
within today's dynamic global context. As a response to this
changing context, the following perspectives on corporate real
estate will be reviewed:
" Real estate as the 'fifth corporate resource',
* Corporate real estate in "The Agile Workplace",
* Corporate real estate as a raw material
Changes in domestic and international markets, the
globalization of production, shifts in technology, brief
windows of opportunity for product innovation, troubles and
caution in the capital markets, shareholder activism,
deregulation of some industries and more regulation of the
environment and the workplace - all of these factors affect
both large and small companies, creating an atmosphere of
inevitable yet unforeseeable change in today's global context.
Taken together, recent changes in the business environment
signal not just another economic cycle but a restructuring of the
economy.
Within such an uncertain economic context, to remain
profitable companies must be increasingly nimble, tailoring
appropriate responses to many sources of change.
Operational/organizational flexibility as a response to this
economic climate has become absolutely critical. Executives
are thus turning to newer, more fluid organizational forms to
align their business units with the company's core strengths.
These changing organizational structures are in turn profoundly
altering work patterns. The whole concept of work has shifted
from isolated individuals working individually to goal-oriented
teams that bring workers together to perform a complex
function and then break apart and reform as new teams. The
increasing numbers of workers loosely tied to the company
then create greater pressures for greater flexibility in the
sharing, schedule and location of work. As social and
economic circumstances of labor change, so does the
relationship of worker to the firm. New organizational
structures are calling forth new physical and non-physical
alternatives to support work.
Real Estate as the 'fifth corporate resource' in today's
global context:
Today's competitive environment calls for business managers
to focus on improving the use of their resources. By making
use of the four major corporate resources: capital, people,
technology, and information, managers have made their
operations more efficient and customer-focused. In 1993 the
importance of real estate's role in this process was emphasized
by Joroff and his research team at Harvard and MIT. In an
environment where scores of real estate units and service
organizations were already rethinking their functions, Joroff et
al described real estate as the fifth strategic resource: "we have
concluded that a corporation's real estate - its land, buildings,
and work environments - is a powerful resource whose
strategic value is just emerging" (Joroff et al 1993).
In the early years of the twenty-first century, it is clear that the
corporate real estate function is beginning to move way beyond
the concerns of growth, efficiency and effectiveness, to
emphasize the efficacy and the significant contribution that
corporate property can make to achieving corporate business
objectives. Corporate property is now beginning to be
recognized as "the means" by which an enterprise connects
both with its resource inputs (e.g., employees and suppliers)
and its customers.
The growing significance of real estate to today's corporation
has been echoed by others. In nominal terms real estate has
been shown to represent: "Often the second most expensive
cost after labor and representing a significant portion of the
asset base" (Weatherhead, 1997). "Around the world
corporations are among the largest owners of real estate assets;
and in the United States they own more than $1 Trillion of real
estate or at least five times the value held by publicly traded
real estate companies" (Deng & Gyourko, 2000). In reference
to the economic context in the late 1980's Veale (1989)
suggests that "The buildings and land held by large
organizations, both public and private, typically represent
about one quarter of corporate worth. Recent estimates have
placed corporate real estate at 7% of total US investable
wealth, greater than the total of corporate bonds (3.4%) or
government Treasury bills (4.0%). Total occupancy costs for
corporations have ranged between 5% and 8% of (pre-tax)
gross sales, which can be upwards of 405 or 50% of net
income." These statistics certainly illustrate the significance
that real estate has come to play in the modern organization.
Corporate Real Estate as the "The Agile Workplace":
The unprecedented reconnecting of people following the attack
on the World Trade Center testified to the resilience and grit of
thousands of people. It also emphasized the basic findings of
the research partnership between Gartner, MIT and 22 Industry
Sponsors, "The Agile Workplace: Supporting People and Their
Work": "a workplace that is distributed and connected, and that
facilitates work anytime and anyplace in a face-to-face or
virtual environment, is a prerequisite of organizational success
and survival." (pp.9, MIT Gartner et al, 2001) This finding
also shed light on two further characteristics that were explored
in the project, "workplace agility and a new professionalism in
the workplace industry."
The MIT Gartner research revealed that "workplace agility has
emerged as the single highest priority for the providers of
workplace services and infrastructure." (pp. 10, MIT Gartner et
al, 2001) What is meant by workplace agility?
" "Agility is the ability to respond quickly and effectively
to rapid change and high uncertainty." (MIT Gartner et
al, 2001)
* "Workplace agility involves both infrastructure
flexibility and a commanding focus on work itself'.
(MIT Gartner et al, 2001)
" Agility means sensitivity to the evolving context,
among other things, and in broad terms an objective of
this investigation is to assess how businesses might
more sensibly perceive that context and adjust to it.
In the context of the workplace, MIT Gartner suggest that
agility is achieved through the co-evolution of the workplace
and work. The co-evolution is only possible when the work is
clearly understood. Agile workplaces then represent the next
important step in workplace evolution. "They are created by
the simultaneous and coordinated development of places and
the work done in them".
This implies a dynamic relationship between work, the
workplace and the tools of work. The workplace thus becomes
and integral part of the work itself - "enabling work, shaping it
and being shaped by it in turn". This is certainly a radical
departure from the more traditional notion of the workplace as
a predetermined, standardized and stationary container of
work.
This shifting of the workplace in terms of agility also suggests
a new way to think about the workplace portfolio. To most
organizations, the workplace portfolio is about real estate - a
collection of properties that are owned leased or controlled in
some way. This is certainly one of the founding premises of
this inquiry. However, this focus on the workplace as a bundle
of services that enables the particular work of the organization
helps us reframe the notion of portfolio to what the MIT
Gartner team phrased as:
a network ofplaces, electronic connections and
management policies that enable agility."
- (MIT Gartner et al, 2001)
Because change and uncertainty are always with us, agility is a
constant objective - a moving target. The notion of workplace
agility certainly implies an emphasis on workplace flexibility.
The significance of flexibility within the corporate real estate
context will be discussed and elaborated on later as one of the
primary drivers of the financing decision.
Corporate Real Estate as a raw material:
Current corporate real estate (CRE) financial management
practices predominantly reflect a view of real estate as an
investment vehicle. However, with such emphasis being placed
on financial reporting in today's shareholder driven context, it
can perhaps be more appropriately viewed as a raw material in
the firm's production process (Deeble, 1999). The focus is on
real estate as a financial asset/raw material for which corporate
real estate managers examine the terms of contracts and the
ability to terminate those obligations. A reading of Porter and
other writers on strategic management (Porter, 1985a, 1985b;
Rappaport, 1986; Tregoe 1980) suggests that both managers
and academics consider the purchase of real estate assets to be
the purchase of an input and not the vertical integration of a
firm into the real estate business.
The reality is that the typical CRE manager is not in the
business of investing in real estate for profit. Rather he is in the
business of sourcing a critical raw material in his firm's
production process. CRE's primary financial relevance to the
firm is not its investment value, but rather its value as a
productive asset. From this perspective the CRE manager's
goal is to optimize reliability, flexibility and cost across the
CRE portfolio.
Deeble (1999) suggests that the fundamental mission of a raw
materials approach is to ensure that availability of materials at
an acceptable cost to the firm, while preserving flexibility to
reduce or terminate procurement commitments as business
conditions change. Deeble goes on to suggest that this can be
broken down into three key objectives:
1. Maximize reliability - the degree to which availability
is assured. CRE managers stress time and again that one
of their most critical tasks is to ensure that space is
available when needed, so that the CRE does not create
an impediment to the operations related to the core
business of the firm. This was certainly one of the
major concerns that became evident through the case
studies conducted as part of this inquiry.
2. Maximize flexibility - the degree to which procurement
commitments can be reduced without cost or eliminated
as business conditions change. In the case studies this
was presented as one of the primary rationale for
leasing and not owning real estate.
3. Minimize cost - procurement costs, occupancy costs
and the potential future cost to carry excess inventory
or terminate procurement commitments.
Following this raw materials procurement process approach to
CRE portfolio management, Deeble suggests that the CRE
manager must essentially answer three questions:
1. How much do I need (and how sure am I)? This should
be tied to a rigorous space demand forecasting process.
2. When do I need it (and for how long)? This is related to
operations assessment issues.
3. How do I pay for it? This thesis focuses primarily on
this question and provides an analytical framework for
making this decision.
In dealing with the question of financing, the CRE manager
then essentially faces two fundamental issues:
" How long do I wish to commit to occupying the space?
" How long do I wish to control the right to occupy the
space?
Deeble(1999) thus highlights two key variables that need to be
managed in the CRE procurement process: commitment &
control. Commitment is the degree to which the firm is
obligated to take delivery of, and pay for, raw materials. In the
context of CRE, commitment is measured in terms of duration.
The duration of a lease commitment is simply the remaining
contractual lease term, excluding options. The duration of an
ownership commitment, on the other hand, is equal to the
useful life of the building. Of course, the firm can terminate an
ownership commitment early by selling the building, but the
existence of liquidity does not shorten the commitment
duration.
Control is the degree to which the firm has the right, but not
necessarily the obligation, to take delivery of raw materials.
Control is also measured in terms of duration, and is equal to
the sum of commitment duration and the term of any options
(Deeble, 1999). In many cases, control can be managed
independently of commitment. Whether a firm commits to a
five-year lease or a twenty-year lease, a purchase option or
several renewal options can often be obtained at little or no
additional cost, assuming they are at fair market value. Many
CRE managers have an unjustified bias towards owning
buildings in the name of maximizing control, without
recognizing that an equivalent amount of control can usually be
negotiated in a lease without over-committing the firm. The
ability to negotiate maximum control in formulating a lease
agreement is certainly a strategy which was used particularly
by Charles Schwab as illustrated in the case study.
From a CRE portfolio perspective, the optimization of
commitment and control durations in an uncertain demand
environment is of critical importance. This suggests that the
optimal financing strategy for CRE is to utilize financial
structures which match commitment duration to the expected
occupancy period. Optimization is thus attained by adopting a
financing strategy of asset/liability matching; similar to any
other capitalized item on the balance sheet. In other words, the
CRE manager should attempt to match the duration of his/her
financial real estate commitments to the real estate's expected
productive life as a raw material.
CHAPTER THREE
ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT
Figure 2 Organizational Context
"Enlightened management recognizes that the
finance calculation is more complex then just lease
vs. buy, reduce space use and lower occupancy
costs. Superior corporate property strategy drives
the top line, enhances the bottom line, maximizes
|n the impact of the marketing budget, reduces
business process and people costs, and creates
extraordinary shareholder wealth."
- Stephen Roulac (2001)
The purpose of this section is basically to define
Does the real estate decision and demonstrate the linkages between corporate
support the corporate strategy and [ FIs the real estate srtgthe other functional strategies cossetwthrfrigtaelett 
taeyadco tereal estate strategy and:
1. overall business strategy
2. real estate operating decisions.
It is perhaps not surprising that issues concerning
real estate and the workplace often escape the
Organizational Context ithoughtful attention of most senior corporate
executives. Although these issues typically fall within the
realm of their responsibilities- and, of course, they use the
facility in their daily operations- many do not appreciate the
potential impact on company performance. So they delegate
real estate to specialists who operate on a deal-by-deal basis
and consider their decisions as administrative and technical
tasks. Most importantly, the specialists alienated perspective on
the core dynamics of the company typically yields poor results
in the generation of an appropriate real estate strategy.
The tremendous importance of corporate real estate to any
business just simply as an asset on the balance sheet is also
largely unrecognized. This notion is advanced in a number of
articles and research studies (Zeckhauser and Silverman, 1983;
Veale, 1989; Nourse, 1990, 1992; Andersen, 1993; Joroff,
Louargand, Lambert and Becker, 1993; Apgar, 1995; Manning
and Roulac, 1996; and Carn, Black and Rabianski, 1999),
which point out how significant property is on the corporate
balance sheet and just how large the component of operating
expenses is that property services represent.
Furthermore, corporate property in the past has been concerned
too much with the facility, and insufficiently concerned with
the relationship of that facility, to the larger real estate markets
and to corporate business strategy. Researchers in corporate
strategic management have rarely been sensitive to the
significance of the properties, in which corporations operate, as
a vital means to connect those corporations to their markets for
resources and customers. As a consequence, the corporate real
estate function generally has tended to be marginalized and
disconnected from the concerns and priorities of a
corporation's senior management and board of directors. An
omission that must-and inevitably will-change. Recently
however, many companies seem to have recognized that by
managing real estate and the workplace as a business function,
they can cut costs significantly, increase productivity, and at
the same time, build value.
O'Mara (1999) suggests real estate and facilities fulfill two
crucial roles in supporting the work of the organization and the
realization of its competitive strategy. The first role is to
physically support the production process. Depending to a
large extent on how they are designed and managed, facilities
can either support or impede communication between people
and the actual flow of work. The second role is the symbolic
representation of the organization to the world. A sound
corporate real estate strategy harnesses both the logistical and
symbolic power of place, and puts it to work to complement
the competitive strategy which has been adopted. What also
becomes crucial is the ability of place to integrate today's three
main corporate resources- people, technology and strategy- so
that they are mutually supportive. (See Fig. 3)
Strategy
Place
People a bTechnology
Figure 3 The Importance of Place
So what exactly is meant by a 'corporate real estate strategy'?
It is widely recognized that every business employs an overall
strategy. Less recognized is that every business with a
corporate strategy usually also has or should employ a
strategy-explicit or implicit-for its primary functions (i.e.,
marketing, human resources, and information systems) (Roulac
2001). Growing numbers of corporations seem to now be
including an explicit corporate property/real estate strategy.
The importance of the link between a company's overall
corporate strategy and its real estate strategy has been
emphasized by various studies, including Roulac (2001) and
O'Mara (1999). Many also realize that not to have a corporate
property/real estate strategy is to put the enterprise at risk.
Nourse & Roulac (1993) maintain that the collection of
corporate considerations that form the overall corporate
strategy, including the driving force, the generic strategies
employed to implement that driving force, and the particular
culture and values of the company, often determine an
appropriate real estate strategy. O'Mara (1999) suggests that
the dynamics within an organization, specifically structural
(organization), cultural and internal financial demands, also
drive the formulation of a companies real estate strategy. In
addition, O'Mara (1999) stresses the importance of the
companies' competitive environment in determining an
appropriate real estate strategy. The multiple factors
concerning products and markets that need to be supported by
real estate may in fact mandate multiple rather than single real
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estate strategies. According to Nourse & Roulac (1993, pp.497)
there are eight generic types of real property strategies:
o Occupancy cost minimization
o Flexibility
o Promote human resources objectives
o Promote marketing message
o Promote sales and selling process
o Facilitate and control production, operations,
service delivery
o Facilitate managerial process and knowledge
work
o Capture the real estate value creation of
business
The positive implications of the strategic management of
corporate real estate have been outlined by Roulac(2001) who
establishes various significant benefits of an explicit, proactive
real estate strategy to:
* Create and retain customers: Physical environments
play an extraordinary role in the marketing function-
both in connecting with and serving customers, and also
in creating and promoting brands. An explicit proactive
approach to three-dimensional marketing transforms the
perception and utilization of property from a cost center
to a significant driver of revenue generation and
growth.
" Attract and retain outstanding people: An
enterprise's corporate property strategy can be integral
to achieving human resources' objectives of attracting
and retaining outstanding people as well as in
enhancing productivity. A superior corporate workplace
environment can contribute to superior business
performance. A superior corporate property strategy
can produce a competitive advantage in attracting
outstanding people; and also can be the means to
achieving and reinforcing other forms of competitive
advantage. This was certainly emphasized by Sun
Microsystems as a critical objective of their corporate
real estate strategy.
e Contribute to business processes: Companies'
business processes occur in places and spaces that
either promote or hinder the effectiveness, productivity
and efficiency of the enterprise's operations.
Notwithstanding the redesign of processes and methods
of doing work, corporate facilities are the settings in
which the work that is integral to the company's
operations is performed.
" Promote enterprise values and culture: The
implementation of the corporation's strategy through its
places and spaces represents a very strong statement of
its values and culture. The places in which a company's
facilities are located and the specific spatial attributes of
those facilities both define and reflect its culture.
* Stimulate innovation/learning: The ambiance of the
places in which company facilities are located, the
access to learning resources, the stimulus of the spaces
in which the company operates, all combine to impact
innovation and learning.
* Enhance core competency: Corporate property
strategy is crucial to core competency-its
implementation determines enterprise access to
resources and markets and also determines the settings
in which the enterprise's interactions and operations
occur. Central to core competency is access to requisite
resources and markets: resources are crucial, because
they are the inputs that make the potential of the core
competency real; markets are crucial, because they are
the outlets of the expression of core competency. All
three case studies conducted emphasized the objective
of real estate to essentially provide support to the
company's core competency.
* Enhance shareholder wealth: The design and
implementation of corporate property strategies have
direct, significant impacts on shareholder wealth. It has
already been emphasized that for many enterprises
corporate property expenditures account for a
substantial part of the capital budget and claim a
significant portion of discretionary cash flow.
There appears to be little doubt that a superior corporate
property strategy impacts and produces positive outcomes in
employee satisfaction, production factor economics, business
opportunities realized and forgone, risk management
considerations, and other impacts on enterprise value. These
consequences enhance or detract from business outcomes-
specifically management's ability to add value to increase
shareholder wealth.
Once the real estate strategy is made explicit, of critical
strategic concern for the CRE function is then the
implementation of operating decisions in a way that
corresponds to the enterprise's real estate strategy. Effective
real estate decisions are integral to the realization of overall
business objectives. The transaction decisions companies make
concerning their real estate assets are essentially operating
decisions embracing the processes of acquiring, controlling,
managing and disposing of real property interests. Drivers of a
company's real estate operating decisions include a diverse
range of issues, from demographics, location and transportation
issues to building size and character, building amenities,
mechanical systems and identity and signage.
Given the diversity, breadth and complexity of these critical
operating decisions, there is a plethora of different alternatives
that might be considered. The critical strategic concern for the
CRE function in implementing the decisions is how to guide
them in a way that corresponds to the enterprise's real estate
strategy. Again, lacking an explicit strategy, operating
decisions may be made that are unrelated to or even in conflict
with the enterprise's overall business strategy rather than being
consistent with the real estate strategy and thereby reinforcing
the overall business strategy.
Nourse & Roulac (1993) also stress that this decision process is
not unilateral but rather involves the search for solutions that is
acceptable to both the corporation and all involved parties.
The operating decision process thus involves negotiation to
optimize competing interests. They also point out that the focus
of this process in the past has predominantly been on economic
issues, all to often at the expense of other important strategic
priorities. Lacking the context of how a particular operating
decision fits with the organization's overall real estate strategy
and ultimately links to its business strategy, such a negotiated
outcome may therefore frustrate and impede rather that
promote the realization of overall corporate objectives. This
implies the need for a very sound understanding of the various
decision drivers considered in the negotiation process: more
particularly, how these key tenets relate with the wide menu of
financing alternatives currently available to corporate real
estate managers.
CHAPTER FOUR U
FINANCING ALTERNATIVES
The real estate manager has many financing alternatives from
which to choose. There is a diverse continuum, with complete
ownership at one extreme, traditional leasing at the other and
hybrid alternatives in between. The aim of this section is to
describe and outline the basic spectrum of alternative
contractual arrangements available to corporate real estate
managers. In broad terms a corporation has five basic
alternatives:
* Direct corporate funding. i.e. purchasing the property
for all cash.
* Leveraged acquisition. i.e. purchasing the property but
financing a substantial part of the cost through
mortgage debt or unsecured corporate debt.
* Leasing the property under a synthetic lease.
* Leasing the property under a bond net lease.
* Leasing the property under a traditional operating
lease.
Note that references to 'ABC corporation' and other illustrative
examples are consistent with the scenario and financial
statements as generated in Chapter Five.
Direct Corporate Funding:
If the corporation elects the all-cash alternative, it will be using
up funds it could otherwise invest in its primary business,
retain as working capital, or distribute to shareholders.
Research carried out by Redman & Tanner (2002) show that
the top-ranked source of financing from a sample of 56
corporations in the United States is, in fact, operating cash.
Assuming that cash is not a scarce resource, as is the case at
Sun Microsystems which is conservatively leveraged with
significant cash reserves, the use of direct corporate funding
may be justified for strategic reasons. Alternatively,
management may justify investing the cash in real estate as a
means of diversification from the core business. Investors
however, would likely argue that it is cheaper for them to
diversify their interests at the investor level. Direct corporate
funding is most appropriate for those properties that are core to
a corporation's operation and in situations where no real estate
investor will value or assume the risk outside the corporation's
tenancy. Examples of this asset type may be manufacturing
plants, clean rooms and call centers.
Leveraged acquisition:
Leveraged acquisition is similar to other corporate borrowing
in that it accesses nominally low-cost funds and enables the
company to purchase and own real estate. The leveraged
position can be accomplished through the use of unsecured
corporate debt or secured mortgage debt. Typically, the amount
of the mortgage debt (loan to value ratio) will not exceed 80%
of the property value, or $7.04 million in the case of the $8.8
million R&D facility as discussed in chapter five. The
company must provide the $1.76 million balance in cash.
Assume again that the company's opportunity cost of capital is
17.5%. In that case, the cost to the company for using its cash
will be equal to its 17.5% investment opportunity rate.
Therefore, if the company invests $1.76 million of its own
funds, its annual expense under this alternative will be (a)
$168,000 (15% of $2 million) plus (b) the cost of the mortgage
debt.
The primary feature of this alternative is 'ownership'. The
value of ownership depends upon the company's estimate of
what the property will be worth when it decides to dispose of
the asset. If the company projects the property will increase in
value, this alternative becomes relatively more attractive. If it
projects a decline, then this alternative begins to lose its
financial allure. In making a typical own vs lease analysis what
becomes particularly evident is the degree to which the
valuation of the ownership option is so highly dependant of the
residual value assumed for the disposition of the asset. Nessen
(2001) states that in making a projection of future value, the
company should keep two things in mind: "One, twenty years
is a long time. In real estate it is often the equivalent of several
lifetimes. Two, no matter what the estimated value is after
twenty years, its current or present value is dramatically less".
For example: $1.00 received in twenty years (assuming a 10%
discount rate) is worth about $0.15.
According to Nessen (2001) this alternative has the following
disadvantages:
Depending upon the actual value of the property after
twenty years, the cost of funds to the company may be
higher than under the leasing alternatives, even when
the tax benefits of owning versus leasing are taken into
account.
* The mortgage will be shown as long-term debt on the
company's balance sheet.
* To the extent the amount of the mortgage ($7.04
million in the ABC example) is less than 100% of the
cost of the property, the company will have to invest its
own equity (or $1.76 million in the ABC example).
* Although the company will be able to deduct interest
and depreciation for federal income tax purposes, the
tax benefits arising from the rent deductions under the
lease alternative may exceed those from interest and
depreciation depending of course of the rent level
negotiated by the parties. Under the leasing alternative
by paying tax-deductable rent, 100% of the rent is
deductible, including the amounts allocable to the land
and to the return of "principal" of the owner's
investment. The lessee is effectively depreciating the
value of both the land and the building. By contrast,
under the mortgage alternative, any debt service
payments made by the company and applied to the
principal are not tax deductible, and depreciation can
only be taken for the building and improvements and
not for the land portion of the property.
There may also be restrictions from a financing point of view.
Firstly, the company will be forced to meet certain loan
covenants as included as terms in the loan agreement. These
may include maintenance of debt service coverage ratios
concerning the mortgagor's ability to service the debt. Also,
lenders generally have interest in the property being fairly
typical and not specialized, since the lenders concern is with
the underlying real estate asset as security for the loan.
Synthetic lease alternative:
Synthetic means fake. A synthetic lease is basically a loan
disguised (and documented) as a lease. Under the synthetic
lease alternative, the corporate user is regarded as owning real
estate for income tax purposes, but leasing it for financial
reporting purposes, due to an asymmetry in the definition of
ownership under tax and financial reporting rules. A synthetic
lease, thus, entitles the corporate user to achieve effective
ownership and control of the underlying real estate asset, while
avoiding having its balance sheet cluttered with (depreciating)
real estate assets and mortgage debt. This duality can create
attractive financial opportunities for corporate users. A
synthetic lease is classified as an operating lease for financial
reporting purposes and as a secured financing for income tax
purposes (Reavey, 2002). For financial accounting purposes,
the corporate user is able to expense the rent paid under the
synthetic lease without having to report either the ownership of
the asset or the debt used to finance its acquisition.
Simultaneously, the corporate user is able to enjoy certain
financial (tax) benefits associated with real estate ownership -
tax savings generated by being able to depreciate the asset
along with potential appreciation in the value of the asset.
The combination of these structural features yield financial
benefits for the corporate user. One is a sharp reduction in the
reported cost of occupancy, which is typically further reduced
due to lower financing costs. More specifically, the financing
for a synthetic lease transaction is underwritten as corporate
(credit-based) debt, not as an asset-based debt. In today's
market, that means the LIBOR-based interest rate (LIBOR
quoted at 1.85% as of 07/28/02) applicable to a synthetic lease
transaction might be a low as 2.5% per annum (1.85% + 65
basis points to compensate for corporate credit risk), versus
4.5-5.5% rate on a conventional real estate loan in today's
market. For the ABC example, the LIBOR - based interest rate
assumed is equal to 3% (115 basis point spread to reflect ABC
Corp's "A" credit rating).
As can be seen from the accompanying Figure 3 which depicts
a typical synthetic lease transaction involving a pre-existing
building, there are three participants - the lender, the lessor and
the tenant. The lender is a financial institution, such as a bank,
insurance company or investment banking firm. The lender
provides financing for at least 97%of the amount of the
financing. The lessor for the transaction is a special purpose
entity ("SPE"), which is usually a bankruptcy remote entity
controlled by the lender, not the corporate user. The third
member is the corporate user/tenant. Typically, synthetic leases
have a term of five to seven years. The rent paid by the tenant
equals the variable rate, interest-only debt service on the
LIBOR-based loan provided by the lender. The lender receives
two types of collateral for the loan. One is a deed of trust or
mortgage granted by the lessor for the purpose of encumbering
the underlying real estate asset. The second is a lien on cash
collateral, such as T-bills, provided by the corporate user in its
capacity as tenant. In the event of a default, the lender can take
the cash collateral and pay off its loan. Upon such payment, the
deed of trust or mortgage is released, leaving the lessor and the
corporate user/tenant to resolve their respective contractual
obligations. (Reavey, 2002)
1 Synthetic Lease Structure For Acquisition Of Existing Facility
Figure 4 Synthetic leasing structure (Source: Reavey, 2002)
The corporation therefore assumes rate, residual and renewal
risk while also fully benefiting from appreciation. The main
attraction of synthetic leases is that they allow off-balance-
sheet ownership of an asset. In order to mitigate risk, the
corporation could actually amortize a portion of the principal
balance in a synthetic lease, in preparation for dramatic
changes in rates or unfavorable renewal terms at the end of the
lease (in the ABC example for simplicity the financing is
assumed to be interest only).
The actual structure of the lease under this alternative is a so
called "bond net lease", since the cost of the financing is tied
directly to the company's overall credit rating. It is also treated
by the company as an "operating" lease for GAAP accounting
purposes. The major structural features of this type of
transaction are as follows:
* The lease term is usually for not more than five years.
However, the company will have several options to
renew so that it can continue to use the property for a
period of time that is probably sufficient to satisfy its
operational needs. In the ABC example, a 5 year term
with options to renew is considered.
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" The lessor will finance close to 100% of the cost of the
property through bond debt, with the interest rate
floating over LIBOR or some comparable index. The
debt will usually mature in not more than five years and
typically, only interest will typically be payable
($240,000 in the ABC example). At maturity, the debt
will either be repaid or rolled over.
* The lease will be in the form of a bond net lease, and
the rent will reflect the floating interest rate payable on
the debt. Consequently, the rent will not be fixed, and
the company will be taking the interest rate risk.
" At the end of the basic term of the lease (i.e., five
years), the company will have the following options:
o To terminate the lease. In that case, the
company must make a final payment that,
together with the rents previously paid, has a
present value of not greater than 89.9% of the
cost of the property.
o To purchase the property at a price at least equal
to the then outstanding debt balance.
o To have the property sold to a third party at fair
market value. To the extent the sale price is less
than the debt balance, the company must pay the
deficiency. If the sale price is greater than the
debt balance, the company can keep the excess.
o Renew the lease, provided that the debt is
refinanced or rolled-over.
From an accounting and financial perspective the basic
advantages to this alternative are as follows:
" The company retains the residual ownership of the
property.
" The lease will be an "operating" lease.
The disadvantages of this alternative are:
* The transaction is, in substance, a short-term
borrowing. Unlike the bond lease alternative, the rent
cannot be fixed for a long-term period. This reduces the
company's protection against inflation and subjects the
company to interest rate risk. The company can obtain a
protective hedge against any interest rate increases
through the purchase of a derivative instrument. The
company will however obviously have to pay the cost
of the hedge, which can be significant if the hedge
contract is for more than six months, thereby increasing
its effective cost funds.
* Although synthetic lease structure has thus far avoided
being regulated away, it is currently under scrutiny by
FASB and is vulnerable to attack by the SEC. Despite
its form, the essence of the transaction is a financing
transaction, and we expect it eventually to be treated as
such by the regulatory agencies.
The tax implications of this alternative are as follows:
" Virtually all synthetic leases satisfy the FASB
Statement of Accounting Standards No. 13 (FASB 13)
criteria for operating leases, which means that net rent
is fully deducible for financial accounting purposes
(Graff, 2001). If tax accounting and financial
accounting were consistent, this would imply full
deductibility of net rent for tax purposes as well.
* However, synthetic lease vendors do not make this
interpretation. Instead, they assert that the corporate
lessee in a synthetic lease should be viewed as the real
estate owner for tax purposes, which implies that the
SPE is viewed as a financier. This tax interpretation is
consistent with tax accounting with favorable
implications for the lessee in general, because it means
that the portion of each net rental payment to the SPE is
deductible for tax purposes as well as the statutory
depreciation deduction for building improvements.
Bond Net Lease:
Bond net leases improve the lease rates charged to the
company, since the tenant's credit is used directly to obtain
borrowing capacity by the owner/lessor of the building with
little regard to the real estate. When reviewed at a portfolio
level, the incremental cost savings of entering into a bond net
lease rather than a traditional lease is high for most major
corporations. This structure is typically utilized for any
substantial lease as a vehicle to lower cost.
Under a bond net lease, the company has complete freedom of
use of the property. In return, the company assumes all of the
real estate risks and obligations of ownership. There is no
abatement of rent in the event of casualty or condemnation,
with one exception: if there is a major casualty or
condemnation, the company will have the option to terminate
the lease. However, if the company does not exercise its
termination option, and the insurance proceeds or
condemnation award are not sufficient to pay off the balance of
the lessor's investment with interest, then the company will be
required to make a final payment to the lessor equal to the
deficiency. The advantages of this alternative are the
following:
* The rents will reflect the credit rating of the company.
In the case of an investment grade company, this will
often result in below market rents. ABC Corp is rated
as "A" credit and a 10% discount on NNN market rents
is therefore assumed.
* The rent structure can be very flexible, including
provisions for stepped rents, floating-rate rents, and a
balloon rent.
* The transaction is typically structured as an "operating"
lease, so that the lease will not appear as debt or other
long-term obligation on the company's balance sheet.
* The company will not have to put up any of its own
capital to control the property. This alternative
represents 100% financing for the tenant.
* In the case of an investment-grade corporate lessee,
there will usually not be any financial covenants in the
lease restricting the company's operations.
* The company will be able to deduct, in full, all of the
rent, including the rent theoretically attributable to the
land portion of the property.
As discussed above, the major disadvantage, and frequently,
the only disadvantage of this alternative, is the loss of
ownership. The company will not own the property at the end
of the lease term and will, accordingly, lose the value of the
residual in the property in, say, fifteen to twenty years.
Traditional Operating Lease:
Under this alternative, the company will lease the property
rather than purchase it. The lessor will be an independent third
party, and the term of the lease will usually be for the period
over which the company requires the use of the real estate,
whether five, ten, fifteen, or twenty-five years.
In the typical real estate leasing transaction, the lessor will be
responsible for many, if not most, of the obligations of
ownership. These obligations include maintenance and repair,
real estate taxes, utilities, and insurance, although the company
may be required to reimburse the lessor for some of these
expenses. In the event of a minor casualty or condemnation, the
rent will abate or be reduced. If there is a major casualty or
condemnation, the company will ordinarily have the right to
terminate the lease.
The advantages of this alternative are common to all leasing
arrangements, in particular:
* In a properly structured transaction, the lease will be an
off-balance sheet obligation of the company and will
not have to be shown as debt or a long-term liability on
its financial statements.
* The company will, for federal income tax purposes, be
able to deduct the rent payments in full.
But there are several disadvantages to be considered:
* As with most of the leasing alternatives, the company
will not own the property at the end of the lease term.
The third-party lessor will be the owner, even though
the company's rent payments will have substantially
repaid all of the lessor's investment with interest
(including any debt financing that may have been
obtained by the lessor).
* As compared to the two other leasing alternatives, the
rental cost will be relatively high, and, frequently,
materially higher than under a bond lease or synthetic
lease arrangement. There are two reasons:
o The lessor will be assuming material real estate
risks, including casualty and condemnation. In
return, it will demand compensation in the form
of higher rents.
o The lessor will be obtaining real estate mortgage
financing. Unlike a bond net lease transaction,
this type of financing will not be based upon the
credit rating of the company but will be tied to
the underlying real estate asset. Therefore, the
mortgage rate will ordinarily be higher than the
bond rate. This higher cost of capital will be
passed on to the company in the form of higher
rents.
e The company will be restricted in how it uses and
operates the property. In particular, there will be serious
constraints on any changes or improvements the
company may want to make to the property.
Also important to be aware of is the FASB 13 restricts the
operating lease designation (as opposed to a capital lease) to
leases that meet four criteria:
" the present value of minimum rental payments during
the primary lease term (including any terminal
payments for nonrenewal) must be less than 90% of
property market value
* when the lease is signed, the primary lease term must
be less than 75% of remaining useful property life when
the lease is signed,
" the lease cannot transfer property ownership to the
lessee during the primary lease term,
* the lease cannot contain an option to purchase the
property at a bargain price.
Some argue that this alternative is rarely a sensible choice for
the company since the rent cost is simply too high. The
property risks being avoided are and can often be insured
against at a relatively low cost. But, the cost to the company of
passing these risks along to the lessor is prohibitively high and
is not commensurate with the dangers being avoided or
deflected by the company. Contrary to this however is the
added flexibility that a traditional lease allows. Most
companies do recognize the fact that traditional leasing is more
expensive. For them the increased expense is seen as a cost or
tradeoff for the increased flexibility which is afforded.
The real estate manager has many options as part of the real
estate financial structuring strategy. The supply and demand of
financing products varies with real estate and economic
conditions. As a result, pricing, viability and financial impact
will vary among the options at any given point in time. In order
to manage the risk of focusing on just one strategy, the
manager should consider at least two alternatives.
CHAPTER FIVE U
QUANTITATIVE DECISION DRIVERS
" Always fundamental to the well-being of our capital markets,
reliable and transparentfinancial reporting is particularly
important in this troubled environment. Financial reporting
cannotforecast the strengths and weaknesses of the economy.
However, financial statements and related information can
provide useful information that allows users to make informed
decisions andfacilitates the continued efficient functioning of
our capital markets. "
-"Impact of the current economic and business environment on
financial reporting", Andersen, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young,
KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers and the American Institute of
Certified Public Accounts. January 2002.
The discussion around quantitative decision drivers will
revolve primarily around financial reporting issues. It is in a
company's financial reports that the results of strategic policies
become public, where the financial consequences of the
activities of the business are recorded for all to see. This
chapter views company finances both from the view of the
managers who want to improve their business performance and
from the view of inquisitive outsiders who want to assess how
the business is performing and why.
The objective of this chapter is firstly to outline the importance
of financial reporting as a means of communication between a
company's management and its investors. In order to establish
some context on the issue the environmental factors currently
affecting financial reporting will also be briefly discussed.
"ABC Corporation" will then be introduced and the impact of
the various financing alternatives as outlined in the previous
chapter will then be examined through the analysis of a simple
prepared scenario. The objective is to provide a comparative
platform in order to assess the financial and accounting impact
of the various financing alternatives which have already been
introduced.
Relevance:
A focus in financial reporting issues is most relevant
considering the current economic downturn in which recent
business failures have combined to create a financial reporting
environment unlike any in recent memory. Investor
confidence, already shaken by significant volatility in the
capital markets, has been further unsettled by highly publicized
restatements of financial statements, which have generated
questions about the quality of financial reporting, the
effectiveness of the independent audit process, and the efficacy
of corporate governance. This environment is creating
significant challenges for U.S. businesses and their
management, boards of directors, audit committees, and
auditors who not only must carry out their unique
responsibilities in their respective areas, but also must work
together to produce the high-quality financial reporting that is
vital to our capital markets.
A Focus on Accounting and Financial Analysis:
Financial statements provide the most widely available data on
public corporations' economic activities; investors and other
stakeholders rely on them to assess the plans and performance
of firms and corporate managers. Accrual accounting data in
financial statements are typically noisy, and unsophisticated
investors can assess firms' performance only imprecisely.
Palepu et al (1996) outline a framework for doing business
analysis with financial statements using four key steps:
e business strategy analysis
e accounting analysis
" financial analysis
" prospective analysis
It is within this context that the performance of a business is
typically assessed in the open market place. The market's focus
on these factors will motivate corporate managers to respond in
a certain way. Within the context of this inquiry the objective
will be to focus on corporate motivations as a reaction to the
market's focus on:
* accounting analysis (evaluate the degree to which a
firm's accounting captures the underlying business
reality) and
* financial analysis (use financial data to evaluate the
current and past performance of a firm and to assess its
sustainability)
The fundamental objective of financial reporting is to provide
useful information to investors, creditors, and others in making
rational decisions. The information should be comprehensible
to those who have a reasonable understanding of business and
economic activities and are willing to study the information
with appropriate diligence. Financial reporting should provide
investors with management's perspective on the historical and
prospective financial condition and results of operations.
Overview of the institutional framework for financial
reporting:
There is typically a separation between ownership and
management in public corporations. Financial statements serve
as the vehicle through which owners keep track of their firms'
financial situation. On a periodic basis, firms typically produce
three financial reports:
1. an income statement that describes the operating
performance during a time period,
2. a balance sheet that states the firm's assets and how
they are financed, and
3. a cash flow statement that summarizes the cash flows of
the firm.
These statements are then typically accompanied by several
footnotes and a message and narrative discussion written by
management.
One of the fundamental features of corporate financial reports
is that they are prepared using accrual rather than cash
accounting. Unlike cash accounting, accrual accounting
distinguishes between the recording of costs and benefits
associated with economic activities and the actual payment and
receipt of cash. Net Income is the primary periodic
performance index under accrual accounting. To compute net
income, the effects of economic transactions are recorded on
the basis of expected, not necessarily actual, cash receipts and
payments.
The principles that define a firm's assets, liabilities, equities,
revenues and expenses are as follows:
" Assets are economic resources owned by a firm that (a)
are likely to produce future economic benefits and (b)
are measurable with a reasonable degree of certainty.
Real estate is an example of a fixed asset.
* Liabilities are economic obligations of a firm arising
from benefits received in the past that are (a) required
to be met with a reasonable degree of certainty and (b)
at a reasonably well-defined time in the future.
* Equity is the difference between a firm's net assets and
it liabilities.
These definitions lead to the fundamental relationship that
governs a firm's balance sheet:
0 ASSETS =LIABILITIES + EQUITY
While the balance sheet is a summary at one point in time, the
income statement summarizes a firm's revenues and expenses
and it gains and losses arising from changes in assets and
liabilities in accord with the following definitions.
" Revenues are economic resources earned during a time
period.
" Expenses are economic resources used up in a time
period.
" Profit is the difference between a firm's revenues and
expenses in a time period.
These definitions lead to the fundamental relationship that
governs a firm's income statement:
0 PROFIT = REVENUES - EXPENSES
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles:
Given that it is difficult for outside investors to determine
whether managers have used their accounting flexibility to
signal their proprietary information or merely to disguise
reality, a number of accounting conventions have evolved to
mitigate the problem. Accounting conventions and standards
established by the standard-setting bodies limit the potential
distortions that managers can introduce into reported
accounting numbers. In the United States, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) has the legal authority to set the
accounting standards. The SEC typically relies on private
sector accounting bodies to undertake this task. Since 1973,
accounting standards in the US have been set by the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB).
Financial Reporting as a Means of Communication:
Financial reports are the least costly and the most popular
format for management communication. Financial reports not
only provide a record of past financial status and performance,
they also reflect management estimates and forecasts of the
future. For example, they include management estimates of bad
debts, forecasts of the lives of tangible assets, and implicit
forecasts that outlays will generate future cash flow benefits
that exceed their cost. Management is likely to be in a position
to make forecasts of these future events that are more accurate
that there of external investors.
Environmental factors currently affecting financial
reporting:
In this section reference is made to a report prepared and
distributed by the five largest accounting firms (Andersen,
Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and
PricewaterhouseCoopers) and the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants in January 2002. The report
summarized the particularly challenging factors affecting
financial reporting today:
* Difficult Economic Times
The events of September 11 and their aftermath have
only worsened already deteriorating economic
conditions. This change in direction has created a
growing sensitivity in the capital markets to bad news.
" Pressures to Perform
Businesses deal with pressures that arise from a variety
of sources, both internal and external. External
pressures come primarily from the capital markets, with
many believing that Wall Street's expectations too
often drive inappropriate myopic management
behavior. Management often is under pressure to meet
short-term performance indicators, such as earnings or
revenue growth, financial ratios tied to debt covenants,
or other measures.
" Complexity and Sophistication of Business Structures
and Transactions
The increasing sophistication of the capital markets and
the creativity of investment bankers and other financial
advisers have fostered a wide variety of complex
financial instruments and structured financial
transactions. Some companies have transferred assets
off-balance-sheet or arranged for units to be acquired
by special purpose entities, retaining substantially all
the risks and rewards of ownership but without
"control". Synthetic leasing is a perfect example of this.
* Complex and Voluminous Standards
Adding to the challenges businesses face are the
number of accounting standards, interpretations, and so
on, that continue to expand the body of technical
material that must be understood and applied in the
financial reporting process. Understanding this vast
body of literature can be a daunting task, even for large
sophisticated companies. Furthermore, as transactions
become more complex, the accounting rules for them
become highly technical and detailed
Having established the context and importance of financial
reporting in today's economic climate the remainder of this
chapter will be dedicated to developing a comprehensive
understanding of the financial statement impacts of the
financing alternatives as described in Chapter Four. This will
be done through the analysis of the following prepared
scenario:
Scenario Analysis: ABC Corporation
The word has got around that the ABC corporation, a local
widget manufacturer, is in the market for suburban R&D space.
ABC has just recently been approached by brokers representing
XYZ corporation, a private family held toothbrush
manufacturer which may be interested in disposing of a
112,500 sf R&D/flex facility on Pine Hill Street. Following
the recent unexpected down turn in the demand for
toothbrushes, XYZ has consolidated its R&D operations into a
single facility just down the road. XYZ is now very uncertain
about the future for their revolutionary ergonomic toothbrush
design and management is divided on the issue as to whether
the Pine Hill Street should be sold or leased. Some members of
the management team argue that the asset should be sold,
afterall "we're not in the real estate business". Others maintain
that ownership of the facility will give XYZ the opportunity to
participate in the residual appreciation of the asset, which in a
market like this "can only go up" according to recent brokerage
reports.
Furthermore, XYZ is privately held and, apart from reporting
to their board, has no analyst or public market perception
issues to be concerned about. From a financial reporting point
of view, whether the asset remains on balance sheet is of little
concern to XYZ management. With such a divided opinion as
to what the company should do, XYZ approaches the ABC
corporation with what it considers to be two competitive
proposals: one an offer to buy, the other an offer to lease. ABC
corp. is to consider both proposals and has one week in which
to respond to XYZ's offer.
ABC is an "A" rated publicly traded company that has been in
widget sales and marketing for years now. ABC knows the
widget market like no one else and believes it has a firm
understanding of what the future in widget technology will be.
The company is thus looking to expand into the manufacturing
business and has recently recruited a team of talented R&D
engineers with the long term objective of developing its own
manufacturing capabilities to take advantage of what it believes
to be proprietary widget knowledge. Following its aggressive
growth strategy, ABC has come to the conclusion that it needs
space. The real estate operating decision has been made and
now with the offers from XYZ a highly desirable asset has
been identified. With the flexibility of alternative proposals
offered by XYZ, ABC faces a dilemma: what financing
alternative should it select in order to control the asset?
ABC Enterprises Inc. - Consolidated Financial Statements without Real Estate:
ABC Enterprises, Inc.
Income Statement
Proforma For Year Ended December 31, 2001
Sales
Cost of goods sold
Gross Profit
Operating revenues/expenses:
Miscellaneous expenses
Insurance expense
Bad debt expense
Depreciation expense(machinery)
Depreciation expense(building)
Amortization of patent
Interest earnings on cash
Operating Profit
Nonoperating revenues and expenses:
Loss on sale of machinery
Interest Expense
Net Income from continuing operations
before taxes
Less: Income tax expense
Net Income
$ 42,000
(11,000)
$ 31,000
$ (8,000)
(1,000)
(1,500)
(1,000)
(600)
(500)
658 (11,942)
$ 19,058
(100)
(2,000) (2,100)
$ 16,958
(5,935)
$ 11,023
Figure 5 ABC Enterprises Inc. Balance Sheet/Income Statement without real estate
ABC Enterprises Inc. - Consolidated Financial Statements without Real Estate:
ABC Enterprises, Inc.
Indirect Statement of Cash Flows
Proforma For the year ended December 31, 2000
Operating activities:
Net Income 11,023
Noncash charges to noncurrent accounts:
Depreciation of machinery 1,000
Depreciation of building 600
Amortization of patent 500
Loss on sale of machinery 100
Decrease in discount on bonds payable 200
Changes in current noncash accounts:
Increase in net accounts receivable (3,000)
Increase in inventory (4,000)
Decrease in accounts payable 500
Increase in accrued payable and taxes payable 435
Decrease in prepaid insurance 1,000
Net Cash provided(used) by operating activities $ 8,358
ABC Enterprises, Inc.
Statement of Retained Earnings
For the year ended December 31, 2000
Beginning retained earnings balance 6000
Plus: Net Income 11023
Less: Cash dividends -3000
Stock dividends -4000 -7000
Ending retained earnings balance $ 10,023
Figure 6 ABC Enterprises Inc. Direct/Indirect Statement Cash Flows without real estate
PINE HILL STREET - BUILDING ASSUMPTIONS:
Pine Hill Street is a 112,500 sf R&D/flex building that has recently received some substantial upgrades
The building is situated in the highly desireable Route 495 - Mass Pike West market on 11.5 acres of land.
Net Rentable Area: 112,500 square feet
Market rental growth rate: 3% per year
Operating expense arowth rate 3% per year
Proforma
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Variable Expenses*: 164,000 168,920 173,988 179,207 184,583 190,121 195,825 201,699 207,750 213,983 220,402
Fixed Expenses:
Property taxes 175,000 180,250 185,658 191,227 196,964 202,873 208,959 215,228 221,685 228,335 235,185
Insurance 7,000 7,210 7,426 7,649 7,879 8,115 8,358 8,609 8,867 9,133 9,407
Total Operating Exp: 346,000 $356,000 $367,000 $378,000 $389,000 $401,000 $413,000 $426,000 $438,000 $451,000 $465,000
(rounded to the nearest '000)
*lncludes utilities, security, repairs and maintenance, building services & supplies, grounds maintenance and payroll.
Figure 7 Pine Hill Street - Buildings Assumptions
Transaction Assumtions:
Assume tenant improvements $10.00 per square foot paid by tenant. Escalation: 15% bump year 6 & 10
Assume NNN market rents: $10.25 per square foot
Proforma 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Triple Net: $1,150,000 1,150,000 1,150,000 1,150,000 1,150,000 1,320,000 1,320,000 1,320,000 1,320,000 1,320,000 1,518,000
Smoothed GAAP rent: $1,235,000 1,235,000 1,235,000 1,235,000 1,235,000 1,235,000 1,235,000 1,235,000 1,235,000 1,235,000 1,631,850
Deferred rent liability $85,000 85,000 85,000 85,000 85,000 (85,000) (85,000) (85,000) (85,000) (85,000) 113,850
Balance: $85,000 170,000 255,000 340,000 425,000 340,000 255,000 170,000 85,000 0 113,850
Bond Net Lease*: $1,040,000 1,040,000 1,040,000 1,040,000 1,040,000 1,190,000 1,190,000 1,190,000 1,190,000 1,190,000 1,370,000
Smoothed GAAP rent: $1,115,000 1,115,000 1,115,000 1,115,000 1,115,000 1,115,000 1,115,000 1,115,000 1,115,000 1,115,000 1,472,750
Deferred rent liability $75,000 75,000 75,000 75,000 75,000 (75,000) (75,000) (75,000) (75,000) (75,000) 102,750
Balance: $75,000 150,000 225,000 300,000 375,000 300,000 225,000 150,000 75,000 0 102,750
In both cases TI's = $1,125,000
Useful life (tax) = 39 years Useful life (book) = 10 years
Annual depr. (tax) = $28,846 Annual depr.(book) = $112,500
* Assume 10% discount to NNN lease rates due to ABC's "A" credit rating.
Figure 8 Transaction assumptions - proposed leasing agreement
Transaction Assumptions:
Initial 5 year term with an option to renew for another 5 years. It is assumed that the option to renew in year 5 is exercised and that
LIBOR remains constant at 2% over the life of the loan. Transactions costs are assumed at 5% and are included in the amount
financed. At year 10 it is assumed that the property is sold to a third party at the same fair market value as in other scenrio's.
Purchase price =
Trans. Cost @ 5%
Total financing:
3 month LIBOR @ say
Basis Point Spread
EAR Loan
Annual lease payment
Purchase price
Land allocation
Depreciable basis
Useful life (tax & book)
Annual depreciation
Estimated Improvements
Depreciable basis
Useful life (book/tax)
Annual~ depreciation
$8,800,000 Note: these transaction costs maybe be amortized over ten years and appear on-balance
$440,000 sheet. In this case they are assumed part of the total financing.
$9,240,000
2.00%
1.50%
3.50%
$323,400
$8,800,000
$1,936,000
$6,864,000
39 years
$176,000
$10.00 per sf
$1,125,000
39 years
$28846
Improvements:
Est. improvements:
Depreciable basis
Useful life (tax)
Annual depr. (tax)
$78 per sq foot
78% building
$10.00 per sf funded by tenant
$1,125,000
39 Useful life (book)
$28,846 Annual depr. (book)
Disposition in year 10 @:
10 Year treasuries
ABC Corp risk premium
ABC before tax cost of de
Taxes
ABC after tax cost of debt
$112,500
10% cap of 2011 market rents
4.6%
1.5%
6.1%
35%
4%
Trans costs @ 2% of purchase price 2%
Transaction costs $176,000 assumed over 10 years
Annual cost amortization $17,600
Loan to value 80% Mortgage constant annual 0.0718
Loan Amount 7,040,000 10 Year Treasury 4.6%
Loan Point at 1% 70,400 Compounding periods/year 2
Assume points depreciated over 10 yrs EAY 10 Year T-Bill 4.7%
Loan Point amortization cost 7,040 Basis Points on Loan 1.5%
Total Loan 7,110,400 EAR Loan 6.2%
Monthly Interest Rate 0.50% EPR 0.5%
Amortization Term (Months) 360 Annual Nominal RATE 6.0%
Monthly Payment ($42,566) Lenders Effective Yield
Annual Payment ($510,793) EAY with points 5.9%
Mortgage constant monthly 0.0060 EAY without points 6.0%
Figure 9 Transaction assumptions - proposed ownership and synthetic leasing alternatives
Note:
Transaction assumptions have been
made in order to establish
parameters for the five alternate
financing options which are being
assessed:
1. Direct corporate funding
2. Leveraged acquisition
3. Synthetic leasing
4. Bond net lease
5. Traditional operating lease
Summary Outnut For 2001 (Y
Earnings
Return on Equity
Return on Assets
Financial Leverage
Current Ratio
Market value @ 15%
$19,158
17.55%
11.14%
1.58
2.10
$15,877
Direct
Funding
$10,341
16.64%
10.56%
1.58
1.35
$5,043
Leveraged
Acquisition
$10,254
16.52%
9.79%
1.69
1.86
$5,311
Figure 10 Summary output illustrating year 1 impact
Discussion:
The above table summarizes the first year impact of the financing alternatives on a variety of financial ratios. These
ratios allow the investor to assess how various line items in the firm's financial statements relate to one another with the
objective of evaluating the effectiveness of the firm's decision. The emphasis here is on the short term impact of the
financing decision. Such a short term perspective is perhaps appropriate to consider bearing in mind the fickleness and
incredibly short sighted nature of the capital markets in the current economic context.
Year One Impact: Earnings/Net Income
$20,000
$18,000
$16,000
$14,000
$12,000
$10,000
$8,000
$6,000
$4,000
$2,000
$0
Without Direct Leveraged Synthetic
real estate corporate acquisition leasing
funding
Bond net NNN
lease operating
lease
Figure 11 Year one impact to earnings
yntnetic
Lease
$10,461
16.80%
10.66%
1.58
2.01
$13,484
Dnd Net
Lease
$9,925
16.08%
10.20%
1.58
2.00
$12,178
raa. uper.
Lease
$9,843
15.97%
10.12%
1.58
1.99
$11,980
Definition:
Earnings: The annual net income for the company. Net income is defined as
the company's total earnings, reflecting revenues adjusted for costs of doing
business, depreciation, interest, taxes and other expenses.
Discussion:
All alternatives result in a significant decrease in earnings. The
slightly reduced impact on the owning and synthetic alternatives
is a result of the 'cheaper' impact of interest expense as opposed
to lease expense under the leasing alternatives. The synthetic
lease alternative tops the ownership options primarily since
depreciation is considered only in tax reporting. In all cases
operating expenses are assumed equal.
Summary Outputs For 2001 (Year 1) Impact:
Figure 12 Year one impact to ROE
Year One Impact: Return on Assets
Without real Direct Leveraged Synthetic
estate corporate acquisition leasing
funding
Bond net NNN
lease operating
lease
Figure 13 Year one impact to ROA, financial leverage & market value
Definition:
Return on Equity (ROE): Net Income/Shareholders Equity
A comprehensive indicator of a firm's performance because it
provides an indication of how well managers are employing the
funds invested by the firm's shareholders to generate returns.
Discussion:
This is a book return on equity and is therefore tied to
a large degree on the impact that the alternatives have
on net income (which is a non-cash accounting
measure). The increased impact of the of the more
'expensive' leasing options therefore have a negative
impact on the company's ROE.
11.50%
11.00%
10.50%
10.00%
9.50%
9.00%
Definition:
Return on Assets (ROA): Net Income/Assets.
This metric indicates how much profit a company is able to
generate for each dollar of assets invested.
Discussion:
Leveraged acquisitions appear to have a more
significant impact on return on assets. This is a result
of the real estate asset being capitalized as an asset
and leveraged with debt. This results in a
disproportionately higher book value of total assets.
Year One Impact: Financial Leverage Definition:
Financial leverage: Assets/Shareholders Equity. This indicates
1.70 how many dollars of assets the firm is able to deploy for each
1.68 dollar invested by its shareholders.
1.66
1.64 Discussion:
1.62 Since a substantial amount of debt is taken on as
1.58 financing, leveraged acquisitions have a significant
obvious impact on the overall financial leverage of the
1.54
1.52 company.
1.50
Without real Direct Leveraged Synthetic Bond net NNN
estate corporate acquisition leasing lease operating
funding lease
Figure 14 Year one impact to financial leverage
Year One Impact: Book value Definition:
Market value: based on a discounted free cash flow analysis.
$18,000 Free cash flows are defined as cash flows from operations after
$16,000 investment in working capital. Since this is cash flow available to
$14,000 all providers of capital - holders of short-term debt, long-term
$12,000 debt, and equity - FCF is expressed on a pre-interest but post-tax
$10,000 basis.
$8,000
$6,000 $4,000Discussion:$4,000
$2,000 The book value of the company is significantly
Without Direct Leveraged Synthetic Bond net NNN impacted by the on-balance sheet presence of the real
real estate corporate acquisition leasing lease operating estate asset. The substantial impact to free cash flow
funding 
_leas in year one appears to be the primary cause of this.
Figure 15 Year one impact to market value
Definition:
Current ratio: Current Assets/Current Liabilities. Useful in
evaluating the risk related to a firm's current liabilities. The ratio
is a measure of the firm's ability to repay its current liabilities.
Discussion:
The primary driver of this metric is cash. In this case
cash has been considered as a current asset, hence,
with such a substantial outflow of cash in year one, the
direct corporate funding alternative has the most
significant impact.
Figure 16 Year one impact to current ratio
Project Specific After-Tax Cash Flow Profiles:
Direct corporate funding ($4,117) (10,248) (154) (161) (168) (175) (183) (191) (199) (207) 10,171
Leveraged acquisition ($5,542) (3,787) (662) (669) (676) (683) (691) (699) (707) (715) 3,764
Synthetic leasing ($2,998) (1,488) (370) (377) (384) (391) (399) (407) (415) (423) 1,463
Bond net lease ($12,075) (2,380) (1,261) (1,268) (1,276) (1,283) (1,441) (1,448) (1,457) (1,465) (1,473)
Trad operating lease 1($13,042) (2,490) (1,371) (1,378) (1,386) (1,393) (1,571) (1,578) (1,587) (1,595) (1,603)1
*NPV is after-tax @ 4%
10,000 Project Specific
After-Tax
7,500 Cash Flow Profiles
5,000 MTrad operating lease
N Bond net lease
2,500
0 Synthetic leasing
0 0 Leveraged acquisition
N Direct corporate funding
(2,500)
(5,000)
(7,500)
(10,000)
(12,500)
Year
Figure 17 Project specific cash flow profiles
Project Specific After-Tax Net Present Value:
Project Specific After-Tax NPV
$0
($2,000)
($4,000)
($6,000)
($8,000)
($10,000)
($12,000)
($14,000)
Figure 18 Project Specific After-Tax NPV
Discussion:
The higher costs associated
with leasing is clearly evident.
In this case the corporation is
paying a premium for the
additional operational
flexibility which is afforded
through the more traditional
forms of leasing. The
apparent discount to direct
corporate funding, leveraged
acquisition and synthetic
leasing is very much
dependant on the assumed
appreciation in the value of
the underlying asset. In this,
case synthetic leasing, which
is basically a (97%) loan
disguised as a lease, trumps
all other forms of financing in
terms of the NPV occupancy
cost.
U
Incremental Impact to After-Tax GAAP Earnings/Net Income:
Direct corporate funding (682) (699) (717) (736) (754) (774) (794) (815) (836) 3,593
Leveraged acquisition (768) (795) (825) (855) (885) (915) (946) (977) (1,008) 3,366
Synthetic leasing (562) (589) (616) (645) (673) (703) (732) (763) (794) 3,340
Bond net lease (1,098) (1,146) (1,195) (1,245) (1,295) (1,350) (1,406) (1,463) (1,519) (1,577)
Trad operating lease (1,179) (1,231) (1,283) (1,336) (1,389) (1,448) (1,508) (1,569) (1,629) (1,690)
After-Tax
Impact to
3,000 GAAP Earnings
*Trad operating lease
* Bond net lease
2,000 C Synthetic leasing
!! Leveraged acquisition
* Direct corporate funding
1,000
0
(1,000)
(2,000)
Year
Figure 19 Incremental impact to after-tax GAAP earnings
Discussion:
The impact to earnings is
primarily an indication of
occupancy 'expense'. i.e.
items which are being
expensed on the balance sheet
and therefore deducted from
the net income of that period.
The three broad groups of
financing alternatives are
clear. Both forms of leasing
have a greater impact to net
income which increases over
time. Synthetic leasing has the
smallest impact on earnings
over time with a significant
boost to earnings being
realized in year ten. Both
forms of ownership track the
profile of the synthetic
alternative very closely.
Incremental Impact to GAAP Cash Flow:
Direct corporate funding (10,928) (853) (881) (909) (938) (969) (1,000) (1,032) (1,064) 11,685
Leveraged acquisition (4,172) (1,087) (1,138) (1,190) (1,243) (1,296) (1,351) (1,407) (1,463) 5,340
Synthetic leasing (1,877) (793) (836) (879) (923) (968) (1,014) (1,062) (1,109) 2,980
Bond net lease (2,627) (1,576) (1,651) (1,728) (1,804) (2,040) (2,125) (2,213) (2,300) (2,388)
Trad operating lease (2,742) (1,696) (1,777) (1,858) (1,940) (2,201) (2,293) (2,386) (2,479) (2,573)
12,500 Impact to
GAAP Cash Flow
7,500 U Trad operating lease
* Bond net lease
o Synthetic leasing
2,500 I Leveraged acquisition
* Direct corporate funding
(2,500)
(7,500)
(12,500)
Year
Figure 20 Incremental impact to GAAP cash flow
Discussion:
In this case the significant up
front capital commitment
required for both forms of
ownership is clearly evident.
The upfront commitment is
made with the hope that
appreciation in the residual
value of the asset will seen
over time and result in a
significant boost to cash from
investment activities. With
appreciation in the value of
the underlying asset being
assumed, synthetic leasing
again outperforms the other
alternatives. The cash flow
impact of ownership is again
highly dependant on the
appreciation assumed.
$ 42,000(11,000)
$ 31,000
(12,991)
$ 18,009
(2,100)
$ 15,909
(5,568)
$ 10,341
Figure 21 ABC Enterprises Inc. - direct corporate funding impact on balance sheet & income statement
Note:
On these and all subsequent consolidated financial statements, the impact of the respective financing alternative is highlighted in order
to give the reader a clear indication of what line items are added or affected by the financing decision. Full balance sheet equations
from which the various consolidated statements are drawn have been included in the appendix.
ABC Enterprises Inc. - Impact of Direct Corporate Funding on Consolidated Financial Statements
kBC Enterprises, Inc.
ndirect Statement of Cash Flows
3roforma For the year ended December 31, 2000
)perating activities:
Net Income
Noncash charges to noncurrent accounts:
De reciation of machine 1,000
Depreciaitioni of txudldig 805
Trans cost aimorttiiAon 18
Amortization of patent
Loss on sale of machinery
Decrease in discount on bonds payable
Changes in current noncash accounts:
Increase in net accounts receivable
Increase in inventory
Decrease in accounts payable
Increase in accrued payable and taxes payable
Decrease in prepaid insurance
Net Cash provided(used) by operating activities
ABC Enterprises, Inc.
Statement of Retained Earnings
Proforma for the year ended December 31, 2001
Beginning retained earnings balance
Plus: Net Income
.ess: Cash dividends
Stock dividends
inding retained earnings balance
-3000
-4000,
10,341
500
100
200
(3,000)
(4,000)
500
68
1,000
7,531
6,000
10,341
(7,000)
$ 9,341
Figure 22 ABC Enterprises Inc. - direct corporate funding impact on direct & indirect statement of cash flows
Direct Corporate Funding - Project Specific Cash Effects
PROJECT SPECIFIC CASH EFFECTS
Acquisition cost (8,800)
Transaction costs (176)
improvements (1,125)
Operating Expenses (346) (356) (367) (378) (389) (401) (413) (426) (438) (451)
Sale proceeds 12,783
Before-Tax Cash Occupancy Costs (10,447) (356) (367) (378) (389) (401) (413) (426) (438) 12,332
Before tax NPV @ 6.1% ($5,312)|
Tax shield @ 35% 199 202 206 210 214 218 222 227 231 (2,161)
After-Tax Cash Occupancy Costs (10,248) (154) (161) (168) (175) (183) (191) (199) (207) 10,171
After-tax NPV @ 4.0% ($4,117)
-J
INCREMENTAL TAX EFFECTS
Schedule of tax deductions:
Operating expenses 346 356 367 378 389 401 413 426 438 451
Depreciation Building 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176
TI's 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
Cost Amortization Loan Points - - - - - - - - - -
Transaction Costs @ 3% 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
Taxable Gain on Sale (6,848)
Incr Impact on Taxable Income 568 578 589 600 611 623 635 648 660 (6,175)
Tax shield @ 35% 199 202 206 210 214 218 222 227 231 (2,161)
Figure 23 Direct Corporate Funding - Project Specific Cash Effects
Project Specific NPV:
Net sales price in year 10 assumed at 10%
cap of 2011 NNN market rents: 10.0%
10 Year treasuries 4.6%
ABC Corp risk premium 1.5%
ABC before tax cost of debt 6.1%
ABC after tax cost of debt 4.0%
Acq cost 8,800
+ Improvements 1,125
+ Trans costs 176
+ Loan points 0
Cost basis 10,101
-Acc depreciation (2,048)
-Acc cost amort (176)
Adjusted Tax Basis 7,877
Net sales price 15,180
Less comm @ 3% (455)
Less adjusted basis _7,877)
Taxable gain on sale 6,848
Taxes due 2,397
Net sales price 15,180
Less taxes due (2,397)
Net sales proceeds 12,783
Figure 24 Direct Corporate Funding - Project Specific Cash Effects
Direct Corporate Funding - Incremental Impact to GAAP Financial Statements
INCREMENTAL GAAP EARNINGS/INCOME EFFECTS
Operating expenses (346)
Depreciation Building (176)
TI's (29)
(356)
(176)
(29)
Cost Amortization Loan Points - -
Transaction Costs @ 3% (18) (18)
Foregone interest earnings (481) (497)
Gain on Sale
Incr Impact to Before-Tax Earnings (1,049) (1,075)
Provision for taxes 35% 367
Incr Impact to After-Tax Earnings
(367)
(176)
(29)
(18)
(514)
(378)
(176)
(29)
(18)
(531)
(389)
(176)
(29)
(18)
(549)
(401)
(176)
(29)
(18)
(568)
(1,103) (1,132) (1,161) (1,191)
(413) (426) (438) (451)
(176) (176) (176) (176)
(29) (29) (29) (29)
(18) (18) (18) (18)
(587) (606) (626) (647)
6,848
(1,222) (1,255) (1,287) 5,528
376 386 396 406 417 428 439 450 (1,935)
(699) (717) (736) (754) (774) (794) (815) (836) 3,593
fliffaranna
Check Year 2001 numbers: Without real estate Net Income '01 =
With real estate Net Income '01 =
$11,023
$10,341
i.e. This is the incremental earnings impact
of funding real estate directly
Direct Corp Funding: Incremental GAAP Earnings Effects
4,000
3,500
3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
(500)
(1,000)
Annual Impact to After-Tax Earnings
Figure 25 Direct corporate funding - incremental tax & GAAP earnings/income effects
Discussion:
The incremental impact of direct
corporate funding on GAAP earnings is
based in the first nine years primarily on
the depreciation of the asset. No initial
significant impact is seen since the asset
is capitalized on the balance sheet. Very
important to realize though is that
significant appreciation in terms of the
residual value of the asset has been
assumed over the ten years, which is
reflected favorably with a substantial
boost to earnings in year ten with the
assumed disposition of the asset.
U
Direct Corporate Funding - Incremental Impact to GAAP Financial Statements
INCREMENTAL GAAP CASH FLOW EFFECTS
Operating activities:
Operating Expenses (346)
Foregone interest earning (481)
Debt service -
Investing activities:
Acquisition cost (8,800)
Transaction costs (176)
Improvements (1,125)
Sale proceeds
incremental Impact to Cash
(356) (367) (378) (389) (401) (413) (426) (438) (451)
(497) (514) (531) (549) (568) (587) (606) (626) (647)
12,783
(853) (881) (909) (938) (969) (1,000) (1,032) (1,064) 11,685
Check Year 2001 numbers: Without real estate Ending Cash Balance '01 = $17,258
With real estate Ending Cash Balance '01 = $ 6,330
.e. This is the incremental cash impact
>f financing real estate directly
Direct Corp Funding: Incremental GAAP Cash Effects
15,000
10,000
5,000
0
(5,000)
(10,000)
(15,000)
Annual Impact to Cash
Figure 26 Direct corporate funding - incremental GAAP cash effects
Discussion:
The incremental GAAP cash effects
allow us to closely monitor the actual
cash flows associated with the asset. This
gives a clearer indication of what really
is going on. In this case the substantial up
front capital commitment is clearly
evident.
0" A
ABC Enterprises Inc. - Impact of a Leveraged Acquisition on Consolidated Financial Statements
$ 42,000
(11,000)
$ 31,000
(12,701)
$ 18,299
(2,523)
Net Income from continuing operations
before taxes $ 15,776
Less: Income tax expense (5,521)
Not Income $ 10,254
Figure 27 ABC Enterprises Inc. - leveraged acquisition impact on balance sheet & income statement
2 -
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ABC Enterprises Inc. - Impact of a Leveraged Acquisition on Consolidated Financial Statements
ABC Enterprises, Inc.
Indirect Statement of Cash Flows
Proforma For the year ended December 31, 2000
Operating activities:
Net Income 10,254
Noncash charges to noncurrent accounts:
Depreciation of machine 1,000
Amortization of patent 500
Loss on sale of machinery 100
Decrease in discount on bonds payable 200
Changes in current noncash accounts:
Increase in net accounts receivable (3,000)
Increase in inventory (4,000)
Decrease in accounts payable 500
Increase in accrued payable and taxes payable 21
Decrease in prepaid insurance 1,000
Net Cash provided(used) by operating activities $ 7,405
ABC Enterprises, Inc.
Statement of Retained Earnings
For the year ended December 31, 2000
Beginning retained earnings balance 6000
Plus: Net Income 10254.1469
Less: Cash dividends -3000
Stock dividends -4000 -7000
Ending retained earnings balance $ 9,254
Figure 28 ABC Enterprises Inc. - leveraged acquisition impact on direct & indirect statement of cash flows
Leveraged Acquisition - Project Specific Cash Effects:
PROJECT SPECIFIC CASH EFFECTS
Equity (1,760)
Transaction costs (176)
Improvements (1,125)
Loan points (70)
Debt service (511) (511) (511) (511) (511) (511) (511) (511) (511) (511)
Operating Expenses (346) (356) (367) (378) (389) (401) (413) (426) (438) (451)
Net sales proceeds 6,860
Before-Tax Cash Occupancy Costs (3,988) (867) (878) (889) (900) (912) (924) (937) (949) 5,898
Before tax NPV @ 6.1% ($5,762)|
Tax shield @ 35% 201 205 209 213 216 221 225 229 234 (2,134)
After-Tax Cash Occu ancy Costs (3,787) (662) (669) (676) (683) (691) (699) (707) (715) 3,764
After-tax NPV @ 4.0% ($5,542)1
INCREMENTAL TAX EFFECTS
Schedule of tax deductions:
Interest expense 423 418 412 406 400 393 386 378 370 361
Operating expenses 346 356 367 378 389 401 413 426 438 451
Depreciation Building 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176
TI's 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
Cost Amortization Loan Points 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Transaction Costs @ 3% 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
Taxable Gain on Sale (6,778)
Incr Impact on Taxable Income 575 585 596 607 618 630 642 655 667 (6,097)
Tax shield @ 35% 201 205 209 213 216 221 225 229 234 (2,134)
Figure 29 Leveraged acquisition - project specific cash effects
Project Specific Net Present Value:
Net sales price in year 10 assumed at 5%
cap of 2011 NNN market rents: 10.0%
10 Year treasuries 4.6%
ABC Corp risk premium 1.5%
ABC before tax cost of debt 6.1%
ABC after tax cost of debt 4.0%
Acq cost 8,800
+ Improvements 1,125
+ Trans costs 176
+ Loan points 70
Cost basis 10,171
- Acc depreciation (2,048)
- Acc cost amort 176
Adjusted tax basis: 7,947
Net sales price 15,180
Less comm @ 3% (455)
Less adjusted basis 7,947
Taxable gain on sale 6,778
Taxes due 2,372
Net sales price 15,180
Less OLB (5,948)
Less taxes due (2,372)
Net sales proceeds 6,860
UFigure 30 Leveraged acquisition - project specific cash effects
Leveraged Acquisition: Project Specific Cash Flow Profile
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Leveraged Acquisition - Incremental Impact to GAAP Financial Statements:
INCREMENTAL GAAP EARNINGS/INCOME EFFECTS
Interest expense (423) (418) (412) (406) (400) (393) (386) (378) (370) (361)
Operating expenses (346) (356) (367) (378) (389) (401) (413) (426) (438) (451)
Depreciation Building (176) (176) (176) (176) (176) (176) (176) (176) (176) (176)
TI's (29) (29) (29) (29) (29) (29) (29) (29) (29) (29)
Cost Amortization Loan Points (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7)
Transaction Costs @ 3% (18) (18) (18) (18) (18) (18) (18) (18) (18) (18)
Foregone interest earnings (183) (220) (260) (301) (343) (385) (427) (470) (514) (558)
Gain on Sale 6,778
Incr Impact to Before-Tax Earnings (1,182) (1,223) (1,269) (1,315) (1,361) (1,408) (1,455) (1,504) (1,551) 5,178
Provision for taxes 35% 414 428 444 460 476 493 509 526 543 (1,812)
incr Impact to After-Tax Earnings (795) (825) (855) (885) (915) (946) (977) (1,008) 3,366
Difference
Check Year 2001 numbers: Without real estate Net Income '01 = $11,023 i.e. This is the incremental earnings impact
With real estate Net Income '01 = $ 10,254 o of financing real estate with a leveraged acq.
Leveraged Acquisition: Incremental GAAP Earnings Effects
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Figure 31 Leveraged acquisition - incremental tax & GAAP earnings/income effects
Discussion:
The incremental GAAP earnings effects
of leveraged acquisition follow the
profile of direct corporate funding. The
only difference between the two profiles
being driven by the interest expense and
other costs associated with the debt
financing. This difference is however
largely offset by the substantial foregone
interest earnings associated with direct
corporate funding.
U
Leveraged Acquisition - Incremental Impact to GAAP Financial Statements:
INCREMENTAL GAAP CASH FLOW EFFECTS
Operating activities:
Operating Expenses (346) (356) (367) (378) (389) (401) (413) (426) (438) (451)
Foregone interest earning. (183) (220) (260) (301) (343) (385) (427) (470) (514) (558)
Debt service (511) (511) (511) (511) (511) (511) (511) (511) (511) (511)
Investing activities:
Acquisition cost (1,760)
Transaction costs (176)
Improvements (1,125)
Loan Points (70)
Sale proceeds 6,860
Incremental Impact to Cash (1,087) (1,138) (1,190) (1,243) (1,296) (1,351) (1,407) (1,463) 5,340
Difference
Check Year 2001 numbers: Without real estate Ending Cash Balance '01 = $17,258 i.e. This is the incremental cash impact
With real estate Ending Cash Balance '01 = $ 13,086 of financing real estate with a leveraged acq.
Leveraged Acquisition: Incremental GAAP Cash Flow Effects
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Figure 32 Leveraged acquisition - incremental GAAP cash flow effects
Discussion:
The incremental GAAP cash effects of
leveraged acquisition also follow the
basic profile of direct corporate funding.
In this case however the up front capital
commitment is reduced by the decreased
$1.7 million equity commitment that the
company has to make.
ABC Enterprises Inc. - Impact of Synthetic Leasing on Consolidated Financial Statements
$ 42,000
(11,000)
$ 31,000
(12,807)
$ 18,193
(2,100)
$ 16,093
(5,633)
$ 10,461
Figure 33 ABC Enterprises Inc. - synthetic leasing impact on balance sheet & income statement
ABC Enterprises Inc. - Impact of Synthetic Leasing on Consolidated Financial Statements
ABC Enterprises, Inc.
Indirect Statement of Cash Flows
Proforma For the year ended December 31, 2000
Operating activities:
Net Income 10,461
Noncash charges to noncurrent accounts:
Depreciation of machinery 1,000
Depreciation of building & TI's 713
Amortization of patent 500
Loss on sale of machinery 100
Decrease in discount on bonds payable 200
Changes in current noncash accounts:
Increase in net accounts receivable (3,000)
Increase in inventory (4,000)
Decrease in accounts payable 500
Increase in accrued payable and taxes payable 133
Decrease in prepaid insurance 1,000
Net Cash provided(used) by operating activities $ 7,606
ABC Enterprises, Inc.
Statement of Retained Earnings
For the year ended December 31, 2000
Beginning retained earnings balance 6000
Plus: Net Income 10461
Less: Cash dividends -3000
Stock dividends -4000 -7000
Ending retained earnings balance $ 9,461
Figure 34 ABC Enterprises Inc. - synthetic leasing impact on direct & indirect statement of cash flows
Synthetic Leasing - Project Specific Cash Effects:
PROJECT SPECIFIC CASH EFFECTS
Improvements (1,125)
Synthetic financing interest expense (323) (323) (323) (323) (323) (323) (323) (323) (323) (323)
Operating Expenses (346) (356) (367) (378) (389) (401) (413) (426) (438) (451)
Net sales proceeds 4,137
Before-Tax Cash Occupancy Costs (1,794) (679) (690) (701) (712) (724) (736) (749) (761) 3,363
Before tax NPV @ 6.1% ($4,004)|
Tax shield @ 35% 306 309 313 317 321 325 329 334 338 (1,900)
After-Tax Cash Occupancy Costs (1,488) (370) (377) (384) (391) (399) (407) (415) (423) 1,463
After-tax NPV @ 4.0% ($2,998)1
INCREMENTAL TAX EFFECTS
Schedule of tax deductions:
Interest expense 323 323 323 323 323 323 323 323 323 323
Operating expenses 346 356 367 378 389 401 413 426 438 451
Depreciation Building 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176
TI's 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
Taxable Gain on Sale (6,408)
Incr Impact on Taxable Income 874 884 895 906 917 929 941 954 966 (5,429)
Tax shield @ 35% 306 309 313 317 321 325 329 334 338 (1,900)
Figure 35 Synthetic leasing - project specific cash effects
Project Specific Net Present Value:
Net sales price in year 10 assumed at 10%
cap of 2011 NNN market rents: 10.0%
10 Year treasuries 4.6%
ABC Corp risk premium 1.5%
ABC before tax cost of debt 6.1%
ABC after tax cost of debt 4.0%
Acq cost 8,800
+ Improvements 1,125
+ Trans costs 440
Cost basis 10,365
- Acc depreciation 2,048
Adjusted tax basis: 8,3171
Net sales price 15,180
Less comm @ 3% (455)
Less adjusted basis (8,317)
Taxable gain on sale 6,408
Taxes due 2,243
Net sales price 15,180
Less financing (8,800)
Less taxes due (2,243)
Net sales proceeds 4,137
Synthetic Leasing: Project Specific Cash Flow Profile
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Figure 36 Synthetic leasing - project specific cash effects
Synthetic Leasing - Incremental Impact to GAAP Financial Statements:
INCREMENTAL GAAP EARNINGS/INCOME EFFECTS
Interest expense (323) (323) (323) (323) (323) (323) (323) (323) (323) (323)
Operating expenses (346) (356) (367) (378) (389) (401) (413) (426) (438) (451)
Depreciation TI's (113) (113) (113) (113) (113) (113) (113) (113) (113) (113)
Foregone interest earnings (83) (114) (146) (178) (211) (244) (278) (312) (347) (383)
Gain on sale 6,408
incr Impact to Before-Tax Earnings (864) (906) (948) (992) (1,035) (1,081) (1,127) (1,174) (1,221) 5,138
Provision for taxes 35% 303 317 332 347 362 378 394 411 427 (1,798)
Incr Impact to After-Tax Earnings (589) (bib)
Check Year 2001 numbers: Without real estate Net Income '01 =
With real estate Net Income '01 =
$11,023
$ 10,461
.e. This is the incremental earnings impact
)f financing real estate with a synthetic lease
Synthetic Leasing: Incremental GAAP Earnings/Income Effects
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Figure 37 Synthetic leasing - incremental tax & GAAP earnings/income effects
Discussion:
The incremental GAAP income effects
associated with the synthetic leasing
alternative clearly illustrate why this
alternative is so appealing from a
financial reporting point of view. The
impact to earnings over the first nine
years is less than any other form of
financing and yet the potential boost to
earnings resulting from the sale of the
asset is slightly more than the other
traditional forms of ownership. The
reason: this is the most highly levered
ownership format.
(645) (673) (703) (732 (b) 79) 340
Synthetic Leasing - Incremental Impact to Financial Statements:
INCREMENTAL GAAP CASH FLOW EFFECTS
Operating activities:
Operating Expenses (346) (356) (367) (378) (389) (401) (413) (426) (438) (451)
Foregone interest earning. (83) (114) (146) (178) (211) (244) (278) (312) (347) (383)
Interest expense (323) (323) (323) (323) (323) (323) (323) (323) (323) (323)
Investing activities:
Improvements (1,125)
Sales proceeds 4,137
Incremental Impact to Cash (793) (836)
Check Year 2001 numbers: Without real estate Ending Cash Balance '01 =
With real estate Endina Cash Balance '01 =
$17,258
$ 15,381
.e. This is the incremental cash impact
>f financing real estate with a synthetic lease
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Figure 38 Synthetic leasing - incremental GAAP cash flow effects
Synthetic Leasing: Incremental GAAP Cash Flow Effects
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Discussion:
The cash flow profile of the synthetic
leasing alternative is equally appealing.
Since in this case the transaction costs of
structuring the deal are assumed to be
included in the amount financed, the up
front capital commitment is mainly
limited to the cost of improvements.
These relatively insignificant up front
costs are then supported at the back end
with significant upside potential,
assuming appreciation in the residual
value of the asset. Again, this profile is
reflective of the highly levered (97%)
nature of the synthetic lease alternative.
(879) (923) (968) (1,04 (,6) 110) 2,980
ABC Enterprises Inc. - Impact of a Bond Net Lease on Consolidated Financial Statements
ABC Enterprises, Inc.
Income Statement
Proforma For Year Ended December 31, 2001
,ost of goods sold
3ross Profit
Operating expenses:
Miscellaneous expenses
Insurance expense
Bad debt expense
Depreciation expense(machinery)
Depreciation expense(building)
Amortization of patent
$ 42,000
(11,000)
$ 31,000
$ (8,000)
(1,000)
(1,500)
(1,000)
(600)
500)
Operating Profit
Nonoperating revenues and expenses:
Loss on sale of machinery
Interest Expense
Net income from continuing operations
before taxes
Less: Income tax expense
Net Income
(13,631)
$ 17,369
(100)(2,000) (2,100)
$ 15,269
(5,344)
$ 9,925
Figure 39 ABC Enterprises Inc. - bond net lease impact on balance sheet & income statement
511z
ABC Enterprises Inc. - Impact of a Bond Net Lease on Consolidated Financial Statements
ABC Enterprises, Inc.
Indirect Statement of Cash Flows
Proforma For the year ended December 31, 2000
Operating activities:
Net Income 9,925
Noncash charges to noncurrent accounts:
Depreciation of machinery 1,000
Depreciation of building & TI's 713
Amortization of patent 500
Loss on sale of machinery 100
Decrease in discount on bonds payable 200
Changes in current noncash accounts:
Increase in net accounts receivable (3,000)
Increase in inventory (4,000)
Decrease in accounts payable 500
Increase in accrued payable and taxes payable (156)
Decrease in prepaid insurance 1,000
Net Cash provided(used) by operating activities $ 6,856
ABC Enterprises, Inc.
Statement of Retained Earnings
For the year ended December 31, 2000
Beginning retained earnings balance 6000
Plus: Net Income 9925
Less: Cash dividends -3000
Stock dividends -4000 -7000
Ending retained earnings balance $ 8,925
Figure 40 ABC Enterprises Inc. - bond net lease impact on direct & indirect statement of cash flows
Bond Net Lease - Project Specific Cash Effects:
Project Specific Net Present Value:
Net sales price in year 10 assumed at 10%
cap of 2011 NNN market rents: 10.0%
10 Year treasuries 4.6%
ABC Corp risk premium 1.5%
ABC before tax cost of debt 6.1%
ABC after tax cost of debt 4.0%
PROJECT SPECIFIC CASH EFFECTS
Improvements (1,125)
Lease payments (1,040) (1,040) (1,040) (1,040) (1,040) (1,190) (1,190) (1,190) (1,190) (1,190)
Operating Expenses (346) (356) (367) (378) (389) (401) (413) (426) (438) (451)
Before-Tax Cash Occupancy Costs (2,511) (1,396) (1,407) (1,418) (1,429) (1,591) (1,603) (1,616) (1,628) (1,641)
Before tax NPV Q 6.1% ($12,010)
Tax shield @ 35% 131 135 139 142 146 150 155 159 163 168
After-Tax Cash Occupancy Costs (2,380) (1,261) (1,268) (1,276) (1,283) (1,441) (1,448) (1,457) (1,465) (1,473)
After-tax NPV @ 4.0% ($12,075)I
INCREMENTAL TAX EFFECTS
Schedule of tax deductions:
Lease payments 1,040 1,040 1,040 1,040 1,040 1,190 1,190 1,190 1,190 1,190
Operating expenses 346 356 367 378 389 401 413 426 438 451
Depreciation TI's 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
Incr Impact on Taxable Income 375 385 396 407 418 430 442 455 467 480
Tax shield @ 35% 131 135 139 142 146 150 155 159 163 168
Figure 41 Bond net lease - project specific cash effects
UBond Net Lease: Project Specific Cash Flow Profile
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Figure 42 Bond net lease - project specific cash effects
Bond Net Lease - Incremental Impact to GAAP Financial Statements:
INCREMENTAL GAAP EARNINGS/INCOME EFFECTS
Lease payments (1,115) (1,115) (1,115) (1,115) (1,115) (1,115) (1,115) (1,115) (1,115) (1,115)
Operating expenses (346) (356) (367) (378) (389) (401) (413) (426) (438) (451)
Depreciation TI's (113) (113) (113) (113) (113) (113) (113) (113) (113) (113)
Foregone interest earnings (116) (180) (244) (310) (375) (449) (522) (597) (672) (747)
Incr impact to Before-Tax Earnings (1,689) (1,763) (1,839) (1,915) (1,992) (2,077) (2,163) (2,250) (2,337) (2,426)
Provision for taxes 35% 591 617 644 670 697 727 757 788 818 849
Incr impact to After- Tax Earnings
Check Year 2001 numbers: Without real estate Net income '01 =
With real estate Net Income '01 =
$11,023
$ 9,925
Difference
i.e. This is the incremental earnings impact
of financing real estate with a bond net lease
Bond Net Lease: Incremental GAAP Earnings/Income Effects
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Figure 43 Bond net lease - incremental tax & GAAP earnings/income effects
Discussion:
The incremental GAAP earnings effects
associated with the bond net lease
alternative are fairly typical of what one
might expect with occupancy cost being
expensed directly and thus deducted from
net income. Tenant improvements are
capitalized on the balance sheet however
and depreciated over the life of the
leasing commitment, which is assumed to
be ten years. Note that this is considered
to be the same for the synthetic
alternative.
(1,146) V(1,195 z4 o)4 (ZV (do (, b 1,6) 151) 157)
Bond Net Lease - Incremental Impact to GAAP Financial Statements:
INCREMENTAL GAAP CASH FLOW EFFECTS
Operating activities:
Operating Expenses (346) (356) (367) (378) (389) (401) (413) (426) (438) (451)
Foregone interest earnings (116) (180) (244) (310) (375) (449) (522) (597) (672) (747)
Lease payments (1,040) (1,040) (1,040) (1,040) (1,040) (1,190) (1,190) (1,190) (1,190) (1,190)
Investing activities:
Improvements (1,125)
Incremental Impact to Cash (1,576) (1,651) (1,728)
Without real estate Ending Cash Balance '01 =
With real estate Endina Cash Balance '01 =
(1,500)
(2,000)
(2,500)
(3,000)
Annual Impact to Cash
Figure 44 Bond net lease - incremental GAAP cash flow effects
$17,258
$ 14,631
i.e. This is the incremental cash impact
of financing real estate with a bond net lease
Discussion:
The incremental GAAP cash flow
impacts follow very much the same
profile as the earnings impacts, except
however in this case the upfront capital
commitment required for tenant
improvements can be clearly seen.
Check Year 2001 numbers:
Bond Net Lease: Incremental GAAP Cash Flow Effects
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ABC Enterprises Inc. - Impact of a Traditional Operating Lease on Consolidated Financial Statements
ABC Enterprises, Inc.
Income Statement
Proforma For Year Ended December 31, 2001
,ost of goods sold
3ross Profit
Operating expenses:
Miscellaneous expenses
Insurance expense
Bad debt expense
Depreciation expense(machinery)
Depreciation expense(building)
Amnrti7ntinn nf natant
$ 42,000
(11,000)
$ 31,000
$ (8,000)
(1,000)
(1,500)
(1,000)
(600)
imnm
iperaung rro i
qonoperating revenues and expenses:
Loss on sale of machinery
Interest Expense
let Income from continuing operations
before taxes
.ess: Income tax expense
Yet Income
(13,631)
$ 17,369
(100)
(2,000) (2,100)
$ 15,269
(5,344)
$ 9,925
Figure 45 ABC Enterprises Inc. - traditional operating lease impact on balance sheet & income statement
ABC Enterprises Inc. - Impact of a Traditional Operating Lease on Consolidated Financial Statements
ABC Enterprises, Inc.
Indirect Statement of Cash Flows
Proforma For the year ended December 31, 2000
Operating activities:
Net Income 9,925
Noncash charges to noncurrent accounts:
Depreciation of machinery 1,000
Depreciation of building & Ti's 713
Amortization of patent 500
Loss on sale of machinery 100
Decrease in discount on bonds payable 200
Changes in current noncash accounts:
Increase in net accounts receivable (3,000)
Increase in inventory (4,000)
Decrease in accounts payable 500
Increase in accrued payable and taxes payable (156)
Decrease in prepaid insurance 1,000
Net Cash provided(used) by operating activities $ 6,856
ABC Enterprises, Inc.
Statement of Retained Earnings
For the year ended December 31, 2000
Beginning retained earnings balance 6000
Plus: Net Income 9925
Less: Cash dividends -3000
Stock dividends -4000 -7000
Ending retained earnings balance $ 8,925
Figure 46 ABC Enterprises Inc. - traditional operating lease impact on direct & indirect statement of cash flows
Traditional Operating Lease - Project Specific Cash Effects:
Project Specific Net Present Value:
Net sales price in year 10 assumed at 10%
cap of 2011 NNN market rents: 10.0%
10 Year treasuries 4.6%
ABC Corp risk premium 1.5%
ABC before tax cost of debt 6.1%
ABC after tax cost of debt 4.0%
PROJECT SPECIFIC CASH EFFECTS
Improvements (1,125)
Lease payments (1,150) (1,150) (1,150) (1,150) (1,150) (1,320) (1,320) (1,320) (1,320) (1,320)
Operating Expenses (346) (356) (367) (378) (389) (401) (413) (426) (438) (451)
Before-Tax Cash Occupancy Costs (2,621) (1,506) (1,517) (1,528) (1,539) (1,721) (1,733) (1,746) (1,758) (1,771)
Before tax NPV @ 6.1% ($12,879)|
Tax shield @ 35% 131 135 139 142 146 150 155 159 163 168
After-Tax Cash Occupancy Costs (2,490) (1,371) (1,378) (1,386) (1,393) (1,571) (1,578) (1,587) (1,595) (1,603)
After-tax NPV @ 4.0% ($13,042)1
INCREMENTAL TAX EFFECTS
Schedule of tax deductions:
Lease payments 1,150 1,150 1,150 1,150 1,150 1,320 1,320 1,320 1,320 1,320
Operating expenses 346 356 367 378 389 401 413 426 438 451
Depreciation TI's 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
Incr Impact on Taxable Income 375 385 396 407 418 430 442 455 467 480
Tax shield @ 35% 131 135 139 142 146 150 155 159 163 168
Figure 47 Traditional operating lease - project specific cash effects
Traditional Operating Lease: Project Specific Cash Flow Profile
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Figure 48 Traditional operating lease - project specific cash effects
Traditional Operating Lease - Incremental Impact to GAAP Financial Statements:
INCREMENTAL EARNINGS/INCOME EFFECTS
Lease payments (1,235) (1,235) (1,235) (1,235) (1,235) (1,235) (1,235) (1,235) (1,235) (1,235)
Operating expenses (346) (356) (367) (378) (389) (401) (413) (426) (438) (451)
Depreciation TI's (113) (113) (113) (113) (113) (113) (113) (113) (113) (113)
Foregone interest earnings (121) (190) (260) (330) (401) (480) (560) (640) (721) (802)
Incr Impact to Before-Tax Earnings (1,814) (1,893) (1,974) (2,055) (2,137) (2,228) (2,320) (2,413) (2,506) (2,601)
Provision for taxes 35% 635 663 691 719 748 780 812 845 877 910
Incr Impact to After-Tax Earnings (1,231) (1,283) (1,336) (1,389) (1,448) (1,508) (1,569) (1,629) (1,690)
Difference
Check Year 2001 numbers: Without real estate Net Income '01 = $11,023 i.e. This is the incremental earnings impact of
With real estate Net Income '01 = $ 9,843 financing real estate with an operating lease
Traditional Operating Lease: Incremental GAAP Earnings Effects
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Figure 49 Traditional operating lease - incremental tax & GAAP earnings/income effects
Discussion:
The incremental GAAP earnings effects
associated with the traditional operating
lease follow almost exactly the same
profile as the bond net lease, except in
this case the impact is slightly greater as
security for the lease agreement is not
tied to the company's overall credit
rating.
U
Traditional Operating Lease - Incremental Impact to GAAP Financial Statements:
INCREMENTAL CASH EFFECTS
Operating activities:
Operating Expenses (346) (356) (367) (378) (389) (401) (413) (426) (438) (451)
Foregone interest earnings (121) (190) (260) (330) (401) (480) (560) (640) (721) (802)
Lease payments (1,150) (1,150) (1,150) (1,150) (1,150) (1,320) (1,320) (1,320) (1,320) (1,320)
Investing activities:
Improvements (1,125)
Incremental Impact to Cash (1,696) (1,777)
Check Year 2001 numbers: Without real estate Ending Cash Balance '01 = $17,258
With real estate Ending Cash Balance '01 = $ 14,516
(2,293a) (2,386) (2,479f) (2-,571 3)
e. This is the incremental cash impact of
nancing real estate with an operating lease
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Figure 50 Traditional operating lease - incremental GAAP cash flow effects
I Traditional Operating Lease: Incremental GAAP Cash Effects I
0 -
(500) -
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Discussion:
The incremental GAAP cash flow effects
associated with the traditional operating
lease obviously also follow very much
the same profile as the bond net lease.
Again, the only difference being that in
this case the expense is slightly greater
for the same reason.
(1,858t) (1,940) (2,20 1)
Chapter Conclusion:
From a financial reporting point of view, it is clear as to why
synthetic leasing is such an attractive alternative. In terms of
occupancy cost, earnings and cash flow impact, synthetic
leasing and both forms of ownership outperform the traditional
leasing alternatives. It should be emphasized however that this
is very much a function of the fact that significant growth has
been assumed in terms of the residual value of the underlying
asset from a capital budgeting standpoint. The performance and
impact of the ownership alternatives is very much governed by
the reversion value assumed for the disposition of the asset in
year ten. It follows that since occupancy costs and asset values
can vary so dramatically depending on the fundamentals of the
local real estate market, business units need to evaluate this
cost impact not only in terms of financial reporting effects but
also within the broader context of the operational and strategic
impact of the asset.
The following matrix summarizes the findings of this chapter.
Firstly, it outlines which alternatives are considered on-balance
sheet or off-balance sheet. The following three drivers are then
presented in the order as investigated the 'ABC Corp' analysis.
Each financing alternative is then ranked one to five in terms of
its performance relative to the other alternatives (one being the
optimal solution with regards to that specific driver).
Considering the:
* After-tax net present value cost (project specific
occupancy cost). The higher costs associated with
leasing are clearly evident. In this case the corporation
is basically paying a premium for the additional
operational flexibility which is afforded through the
more traditional forms of leasing. The apparent
discount to direct corporate funding, leveraged
acquisition and synthetic leasing is very much
dependant on the assumed appreciation in the value of
the underlying asset. In this, case synthetic leasing,
which is basically a (97%) loan disguised as a lease,
trumps all other forms of financing in terms of the NPV
occupancy cost.
* After-tax impact to GAAP earnings. The three broad
groups of financing alternatives are clear. Both forms of
leasing have a greater impact to net income which
increases over time. Synthetic leasing has the most
insignificant impact on earnings over time with a
significant boost to earnings being realized in year ten.
Both forms of ownership track the profile of the
synthetic alternative very closely and result in a very
slightly higher positive impact being realized in year
ten.
* After-tax impact to GAAP cash flow. In this case the
significant up front capital commitment required for
both forms of ownership is clearly evident. The upfront
commitment is made with the hope that appreciation in
the residual value of the asset will seen over time and
result in a significant boost to cash from investment
activities. With appreciation in the value of the
underlying asset being assumed, synthetic leasing
outperforms the other alternatives. The cash flow
impact of ownership is again highly dependant on the
appreciation assumed.
Basic spectrum of financing alternatives
Direc orporate Leveraged Acquisition Synthetic Lease Bond Net Lease Traditional Operating
* 3 .5Fuding Lease
Decision Drivers: Motivation:
On/Off Keep debt off the
Balance sheet balance Sheet
After-Tax Net Minimize occupancy
Present Value Cost costs
After-Tax Impact to Satisfy capital
GAAP Earnings markets
After-Tax Impact to Maintain cash
GAAPCashFlow reserves to remainGAAP Cash Flow agile
Figure 51 Decision matrix - quantitative drivers
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CHAPTER SIX
QUALITATIVE DECISION DRIVERS
Financial implications are just one of many decision drivers
that are considered in assessing the overall suitability and
effectiveness of the specific contractual arrangement adopted
in exercising control over real estate assets. The purpose of this
section is to outline what appear to be the primary qualitative
decision drivers:
* Flexibility
* Strategic importance and control
* Allocation of capital
* Risk management
* Other considerations
Flexibility:
The Gartner/MIT Research Consortium met in July 2000 to
identify the issues, trends and themes that underscore the
evolving workplace industry. A key long term trend which
evolved from the discussion was the theme of "flexibility":
perhaps the greatest challenge in the workplace industry today
is to provide a degree of flexibility to the constant changes in
user needs and business operations. Real estate is an inherently
inflexible asset, yet corporate real estate managers increasingly
need to find ways in which flexibility can be achieved.
Facilities are generally acquired on relatively long term
contracts; capital assets are amortized over three or more years.
Yet, enterprises need to change, adjust and contract on a
moment's notice to remain competitive. Shorter planning
horizons, increasing corporate experimentation and growth
through mergers and acquisitions are but a few of the
influences which have led to the need for more flexible
resources.
Gibson (2000) suggests that there are numerous reasons why
flexibility has become so important:
* Organizations are faced with an environment which is
changing rapidly and which is increasingly difficult to
predict.
" The way in which senior managers are dealing with this
increasing uncertainty is by experimenting and setting
up pilot projects.
* Organizations are constantly reinventing themselves.
* The trend for growth through merger and acquisition is
posing new challenges for organizations.
* Even at the most mundane level, corporate real estate
managers must find ways to facilitate the less strategic
changes.
From the point of the CRE manager, the physical, functional
and financial aspects of a property are those over which they
have control or influence. Gibson (2000) suggests one way in
which corporate real estate managers can gain a greater insight
into the problem is by recognizing that real estate is often
considered from a variety of perspectives, as a:
* Physical asset: CRE managers are concerned with
aspects of design including floorplate sizes, column
placement and building services.
* Functional asset: CRE managers consider what
activities can actually be undertaken inside a building.
* Financial asset. CRE managers examine the terms of
contract and the ability to terminate those obligations.
Each of these perspectives in turn leads to a different source of
flexibility and it is clear that flexibility is very much a
multidimensional issue with different types of flexibility
required for different situations. The content of this discussion
will however focus on the perspective of real estate as a
financial asset.
It has been traditionally argued that financial flexibility was
only possible through freehold ownership - it was maintained
that only by owning the asset did a corporate occupier have
total control over what could happen to the property, such as
sell or sublet. In this context a lease was typically seen as
having both financial and contractual constraints which impede
overall flexibility. Contrary to this however, many corporate
users would argue that a lease actually gives more flexibility in
terms of operational commitments in that it affords easier
disposition and essentially also means limiting the company's
liability in terms of exposure to residual value of the asset. The
case studies conducted as part of this investigation would
certainly support the standing that corporate real estate
managers regard leasing as more flexible to ownership -the
primary reason being that in such a dynamic business context
space needs are extremely volatile. Leasing gives the
corporation the flexibility to meet this constantly changing
need. Many felt that ownership often would end up in an over-
commitment on behalf of the company. Furthermore, many
also suggested that a comfortable level of "control", as opposed
to the flexibility needed, could be negotiated through the
structuring of a lease agreement. This debate on financial
flexibility has also recently included a number of financial re-
engineering possibilities such as the total outsourcing of an
organization's real estate portfolio. The problem with much of
the literature appears to be in the lack of differentiation
between flexibility within a single building and flexibility
across a property portfolio as a whole.
What is clear however, is that the physical, functional and
financial flexibility as discussed above is only achievable at
extra cost. For instance, establishing standardized office
layouts throughout a large office building often means
substantial investment in new furniture and equipment. Using
serviced office accommodation has a much higher cost over a
long-term period than renting an office on a standard lease. If
the flexibility within the building is not required for the current
or future organizational activities then the extra investment or
cost will be unnecessary.
Strategic importance and control:
The notion of flexibility tied very closely to the strategic
importance of the asset being considered. i.e. from a strategic
perspective corporate real estate managers must consider when
flexibility is necessary and when is it non-essential. The
strategic importance of an asset appears to establish the level of
control that is desirable from the corporate real estate
manager's perspective. Referring back to our discussion of
corporate real estate as a raw material, control in this context
can be considered the degree to which the firm has the right,
but not necessarily the obligation, to occupy space. This
control can then be measured in terms of duration and is equal
to the sum of commitment duration and the term of any options
(Deeble, 1999).
Possibly the most appropriate way to look at the issue of
strategic importance is on a portfolio-wide basis, considering
what are an organization's core and periphery real estate
requirements. This will then provide the CRE manager with a
firm base for working towards the elusive goal of flexible real
estate. In this way, the strategic importance determines the
comfortable degree of control which the company desires to
maintain over the asset. This will in turn establish certain
parameters within which the CRE manager will have the
objective of maximizing the company's flexibility to react to
the often volatile economic environment.
Reference has been made in some sources (Gibson, 2000) to
other resource literature. For instance in human resource
management, the focus on core business and the delayering of
organizations led to an examination of the employment
contracts across the workforce. The concept of a core and
peripheral workforce to underpin a business was developed to
try and articulate where labor-force flexibility was needed
(Institute of Personnel Management, 1986). This concept has
been applied to an organization's corporate real estate portfolio
in order to gain a greater understanding of how overall
flexibility might be managed across a portfolio. Following this,
Gibson & Lizieri (2000) developed a three-tired approach to
examining a corporate office portfolio in terms of what might
be seen as core and periphery real estate requirements:
2 nd Periphery Portfolio 2'Pay as you use
Required at short notice
( May be specialst space
1 Periphery Portfolio it Short Lease / Licence
e fSome services expected
Ability to exit
u Freehold / Long Lease
U Control all aspects
_ Ability to change use
Figure 52 "The core-periphery property portfolio" (Source: Gibson,
2000)
At the centre of an organization's requirements would be the
core portfolio. This is not intended to map onto core activities
or core staff, but to reflect an assessment by the corporate real
estate manager of buildings within the portfolio which are
considered to be needed by the organization for the long term.
This could include facilities which are strategically located
(manufacturing facilities), landmark buildings which embody
the history and culture of the organization (headquarters
buildings) and space relating specifically to the organization's
source of competitive advantage (research and development
facilities). These are the buildings the organization would be
willing to invest in but would also want a high degree of-
control to adapt them as the organization changes. The key
flexibility issue would relate to functional flexibility, the ability
to change the use of the building, and by implication some
physical flexibility. Financial flexibility in terms of the ability
to exit quickly is less important.
The first level of periphery property is that where 'numerical
flexibility' is required. As the demand for products or services
fluctuates over the business cycle, the organization will want to
be able to service that demand in times of boom but to reduce
the costs in times of recession. The key issue here is having
some functional flexibility in order to allow for marginal
growth within the building but more importantly the ability to
exit the financial contract at particular points in time.
The second level of periphery portfolio relates to the
requirement organizations have for very short-term space.
Speed of entry and exit are paramount and therefore financial
flexibility is the most important. There are two types of space
which appear to fall into this category: first, specialist spaces
like training facilities which are used infrequently throughout
the year by the organization. Secondly, there is a growing need
for generic office space to house overflow activities on a short-
term basis or entry into new markets prior to establishing a
more permanent presence.
Although in practice there is no clear divide between the three
levels, the model does provide a framework for examining the
organization's property portfolio in a different way. The
balance between the layers will be different for every company,
depending on the sector and competitive situation. Gibson &
Lizieri (2000) estimate 60 per cent core supported by 40 per
cent peripheral.
A similar framework of analysis is suggested by Krzysko &
Marciniak (2001). Through an examination of a Fortune 100
company portfolio with more than 10,000 properties,
consisting of 50 million square feet, Krzysko & Marciniak
(2001) showed that:
* More than 9,000 properties (4 8 %) are considered
"specialized" in supporting business units whose real
estate needs are stable. These properties were therefore
owned.
* Only 228 properties (less than 1%) are small and
subject to variable business needs. These properties
were therefore best structured as leases.
* The remaining 979 properties (51%) are subject to
changing internal corporate needs and widespread real
estate industry investment. According to the CRE
management they are not clear-cut lease-or-own
decisions.
Krzysko & Marciniak (2001) found a similar distribution and
trend across the real estate portfolios of numerous other
Fortune 500 companies such a DaimlerChrysler, Xerox
Corporation, Delphi Automotive, Ameritech Corporation and
Square D. Unique, long-term assets were generally owned;
generic spaces were typically leased.
Allocation of Capital:
A debate has emerged as to whether it is harmful to companies
to commit much of their scarce capital to investments outside
their core competencies (Linneman, 1998). Linneman and
others also suggest that high cost of capital firms in particular
should avoid committing to ownership or relatively low return
buildings, thus creating a negative arbitrage situation. On the
other hand however, capital budgeting principles do not
support this argument. For instance, Brealey & Myers (2000)
argue that each investment project considered by the firm
should be evaluated at its own opportunity cost of capital: the
cost of capital thus depends upon the use (and risk) to which
the capital is put. A company with a highly cyclical product
line and a relatively high cost of capital that owns its real estate
thus has less risk exposure that an equivalent firm that leases
its space short term.
Deng & Gyourko (1998) elaborate on Linneman's ideas by
suggesting that there are a variety of reasons as to why
companies that commit relatively large amounts of capital to
real estate could underperform:
1. The companies may tend to sub-optimally utilize their
real estate. In other words, as inefficient real estate
users they may not be earning a high enough risk
adjusted return on their real property assets. Following
this we would expect all firms with relatively high real
estate concentrations to suffer return penalties, not just
riskier firms with high costs of capital.
2 Investors in such companies may not want them to
change their risk profiles by committing substantial
capital to real estate resources. The primary reason for
this being the notion that diversitication of risk occurs
more cheaply at the investor level that at the corporate
level. There is thus incentive for investors to desire
"pure play" corporations that focus on their core
competencies. Following this, one would expect hybrid
profile companies to underperform the pure players.
Since the beta of commercial real estate is in the 0.8-0.9
range (Gyourko & Keim, 1992), most of the impact
would then fall on the relatively risky, higher cost of
capital firms.
3. Investors do not fully comprehend that ownership of a
significant proportion of real estate assets lowers the
risk profile of high risk firms. With the lowering of risk
not being perceived investors effectively discount the
real estate investments at to high a rate. It is hard to
believe that such ignorance on behalf of the investor is
likely to be sustained for a prolonged period of time.
In their report prepared for the Corporate Real Estate Portfolio
Alliance, Deng & Gyourko (1999) examined firm level returns
for 717 companies in 57 different non-real estate industries to
see whether more real property ownership really is associated
with lower returns. More specifically they tested for whether
the idiosyncratic component of firm return is less for firms with
relatively high levels of real estate ownership. The results
showed a statistically and economically significant negative
relation between the idiosyncratic component of firm return
and the degree of real estate ownership for firms with greater
systematic risk than that associated with commercial real
estate. Hence the results indicated that the negative impact on
return occurs only for firms with relatively high costs of
capital.
For the purpose of this inquiry the overall capital commitment
required for each alternative will be assumed to be a function
of the after-tax net present value cost of the project over time,
with an emphasis being placed on the commitment required in
the first year (see figure 16)
Risk Management:
"You are where you are today as a result ofyour reaction to
the risks that youficed. Where you go tomorrow depends on
the how well you adapt to the changing risk environment. low
iiell you adapt depends on whether you react to risks as they
occur or strategically position yourselfhy using proactive risk
management as a competitive advantage.
- "Managing risk in the 2Is century", Global Real Estate Now, Spring
2001
There seems little doubt that significant value can be
recognized through proactive risk management practices.
Unfortunately though most risk management platforms are
limited to crisis management and insurance based techniques
which are often driven by the lack of focused risk relevant
information about the company's investments. In order to
holistically understand the nature of this dilemma within the
context of corporate real estate it would be necessary to
consider the full universe of risks that a company is exposed to
in maintaining some form of control over its real estate assets.
How can this risk then be categorized in a way that helps the
corporate real estate manager understand the level of risk as it
effects the enterprise on both an asset specific and portfolio
wide basis? Also, from a strategic perspective, what are the
risks associated with an organization's corporate real estate
portfolio? How can corporate real estate managers assess these
risks in order to decide which risks might be transferred?
A detailed investigation of the full spectrum of risks that a
company exposes itself to in the corporate real estate context is
beyond the scope of this investigation. However, with the hope
of at least addressing some of the above questions, what will be
presented is a framework proposed by Louargand & Gibson
(2002). This will serve to define the broad categories of risk
that CRE managers should be concerned about.
Any transfer of risk implies that the workplace fully
understands the types and sources of workplace risk. If
organizations are attempting to manage the corporate real
estate risk, then they need a framework to identify the sources
of risk in a similar way to that developed for strategic business
risk by Simons (1999). Louargand & Gibson (2002) suggest
that there are three general categories of risk associated with
corporate property: financial risk, property market risk and
business risk. Although there is some overlap, each of these
need to be understood and managed:
* Financial Risks
Currently, few organizations can predict their on-going
workplace costs with any degree of certainty and
therefore this exposes them to financial risks.
Additionally, they do not know when they are likely to
require more or less accommodation and therefore this
adds another layer of financial risk as both the cost of
entry and exit from space are unknown. The financial
risks are both direct and indirect. They potentially
affect both the shortrun cash flow events and have long-
run impact on total enterprise value. In this element of
risk the focus relates to the impact of real estate on both
the income statement and the balance sheet. These are
risks associated primarily with the quantitative drivers
issues highlighted in Chapter Five. For example:
o the resulting impact on the income statement of
a decision to use floating rate debt for capital
investment programs if unanticipated inflation
occurs,
o the impact on the firm's financial ratios or credit
rating due to a change in the accounting
treatment of long-term leasehold obligations.
Property Market Risks
Related to the general financial risk is the property
market risk to which all occupiers are exposed. Firstly
as an owner-occupier, a corporation is exposed to the
same risk as any other property investor, both in terms
of the rate of return and the volatility of those returns.
As a tenant, they are also exposed to the property
market both at the time of initially signing a lease, and
at every review period. Corporations cannot align their
expansion and contraction requirements to the property
cycle and therefore can get trapped signing leases at the
top of
peak.
a market, only to find that rents fall from this
o sharp increases in occupancy costs due to rent
escalation as seen in U.S. markets in the year
2000;
o deteriorating location quality due to a shift in
external agglomeration generators such as
transport nodes or neighborhood deterioration or
a shift in the types of sub-market occupancies;
* Business Risks
The final type of risk is that linked back to the business.
If an organization is either unable to function or can
only function inefficiently, then there is a risk of
financial loss in terms of lower business revenues or
increased costs. These latter business risks. although
much more common, are more difficult to predict or
even estimate. These may include:
o risks such as a failure of the heating or air
conditioning systems, halting work temporarily
or the inability to acquire contiguous space thus
impeding operations.
o lack of flexibility in the physical structure
hampering business operations.
A company's exposure to business risk is considered to
be primarily a function of amount of control the
company has over the asset. A higher degree of control
and commitment will mean an ability and desire to
customize the space to a greater degree, thus
minimizing business risk.
All three of these types of risks need to be reviewed in order to
assess the overall risk profile of the assets. Furthermore, it is
important to realize the different role that financing alternatives
can play in either mitigating or exposing these risks. For
instance, direct corporate funding, leveraged acquisitions and
synthetic leasing all expose the company to significant property
market risk in the specific form of residual risk. On the other
hand, bond net leases and traditional operating leases will
expose the company to property market risk in the form of
renewal risk. Synthetic leasing and leveraged acquisitions will
expose the company to interest rate risk. In carrying out such
an assessment, the company should also assess which risks are
possible to transfer and which can best be managed by the
organization itself? Which properties are more vulnerable to
certain risks and how should these be treated?
Other considerations may include:
Taxes:
It is less clear today than it was prior to 1986 whether
corporations or individuals are tax-favored owners of real
estate. Simple rule of thumb on taxes in lease-versus-buy
decisions: if the lessor is in a higher tax bracket than the lessee,
then leasing puts "ownership" of the asset in the hands of the
party that can most benefit from the tax shelter provided by
depreciation. According to Brueggeman & Fisher (1997) the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 substantially reduced the incentive for
individuals to lease to corporations in several ways. First, it
lengthened tax depreciation lives, thus lowering the tax shield.
Second, the highest marginal tax rate for corporations (34%) is
now slightly higher than that of wealthy individuals (31%).
Third, individuals are subject to limitations on "passive" losses
that restrict their ability to use accounting losses from real
estate to offset other income. These tax law changes have
significantly leveled the playing field of among partnerships,
corporations, and tax-exempt entities such as pension funds as
owners of real estate. For this reason, taxes are far less likely
today to be the deciding factor in corporate own-versus-lease
decisions.
Existing management expertise:
Since owning and managing real estate is not typically a
primary part of a corporation's business activity, the
corporation may not have the in-house expertise to actually
manage the assets. Thus the corporation can be at a competitive
disadvantage when it comes to owning real estate. It is often
difficult for inexperienced managers to assess the true cost of
using the space, leading to inefficient use of real estate.
Leasing is typically favored when the company does not have a
comparative advantage relative to developers and other
investors in managing property and eventually selling it.
Access to Capital Markets:
Real estate is very capital intensive and the cost of owning real
estate is typically a function of the cost of obtaining debt and
equity capital. Companies with a high credit rating may be able
to obtain unsecured corporate debt and equity at a cost less
than the cost of capital for the individual or institutional
investor that would be willing to own and lease the real estate
to the corporation. This would tend to make owning preferable
because the lease rate must cover the owner's cost of capital.
Conversely, the corporation that for some reason has a higher
cost of capital relative to a potential lessor might find leasing
more attractive.
If a property is mortgaged, we might expect the rate to be the
same for the corporation or the investor, assuming the rate is
based on the risk of the real estate rather than the risk of the
borrower. If the loan is made with recourse to the borrower,
however, the mortgage for corporations and investors could
differ.
Lifecycle issues:
Where the corporation is in terms of its life cycle and
development will have an impact on the decision. For instance,
a newly formed software company will have difficulty securing
a loan to construct a building, since it has a limited credit
history and needs to plough scarce capital into core business
development. For many start-up companies, space needs also
grow exponentially and therefore cannot be accurately
predicted. On the other hand, more established companies with
predictable revenue streams, deep pockets and access to vast
amounts of capital will have the ability, capital and resources
to dedicate to perhaps purchasing core assets at competitive
market rates.
Third party involvement:
The ability and availability of third party organizations to more
efficiently bear the risks associated with real estate ownership
may be a driver considered in making the financing decision.
Certain synergies may exist between the corporation and risk-
bearing third parties. Third party organizations may also have
an affinity for real estate related exposure in order to diversify
their portfolio interests.
U
Chapter Conclusion:
It is clear that despite the typical focus on primarily occupancy
cost related issues, there is a wide spectrum of qualitative
drivers that motivate various financing alternatives. Some
drivers appear to have a significant impact on the decision and
are easily modeled in the process. Other less obvious drivers
are however, more difficult to incorporate explicitly in the
decision analysis, and yet certainly affect the final outcome.
The following matrix serves to summarize the perspectives
which have been established in this chapter. Unlike the
quantitative drivers considered in the previous chapter, these
qualitative drivers are obviously far more difficult to measure
empirically and some would certainly argue against such a
strict definition. The matrix is perhaps most valuable as a basis
for discussion.
Decision Drivers: Motivation:
Adaption to constantlyOperational changing user needs
Flexibility and business operations
Strategic
Importance
and Control
Allocation of
Capital
Risk Management
Maintain control over
strategically core
assets
Invest shareholder's
capital in higher
yielding core business
Financial/interest
rate riskexpsoure
Residual property
market risk exposure
Business risk exposure
Lw
Cc re
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CASE STUDIES CASE STUDY 1: WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION
Prior to conducting a series of case studies and interviews, a
rigorous and comprehensive case study protocol (see
Appendix) was established in order to give the discussion
structure and ensure that appropriate information was extracted
from the sources. Beginning with an effort to understand the
context and competitive environment of the corporation
through to gaining a deeper understanding of what decision
drivers the company considered in making its financing
decisions, the protocol is based on the following outline:
1. Understanding the context:
* Overall corporate strategy
* Corporate real estate strategy
* Real Estate operating decisions
2. Establishing the financing spectrum
3. Considering the decision drivers
"Our vision is to be one company worldwide."
- David Whitwarm, Whirlpool's CEO, Harvard Business Review, 1994
With the help of Jones Lange LaSalle, the Whirlpool
Corporation kindly granted access to:
* Carl Nedderman, Director, Corporate Real Estate,
* Lee Utke, Real Estate Asset Manager - Global Assets,
* Frank Luongo, Director, Treasury Operations The
Americas.
The following case study focuses primarily on two stages of
Whirlpool's corporate real estate evolution: the decision
process prior and then post the implementation of a decision-
making model that reflects and responds to certain corporate
priorities that was developed with the help of Jones Lange
LaSalle (JLL). Important to emphasize is that although the
model was generated with the assistance of JLL, the
identification and articulation of the various drivers was
accomplished primarily by representatives of Whirpool's
Treasury, Real Estate, Finance and Tax and Accounting
functions. Given the magnitude of the company's global real
estate portfolio and the increased pressure on all corporations
to enhance balance-sheet performance, the objectives were
clearly focused on attaining strategic corporate goals and not
on implementing tactical real estate solutions.
The case is illustrative of a company struggling to deal with
rapidly expanding global operations with the clear need to
centralize the analysis of and decision-making process for real
estate financing, thus ensuring that the decisions not only
reflect the optimal balance-sheet structure but also address
critical operational requirements.
Company Overview:
Whirlpool Corporation is one of the world's leading
manufacturers and marketers of major home appliances. The
company manufactures in 1 3 countries and markets products in
more than 170 countries around the globe. Whirlpool is also
the principal supplier to Sears, Roebuck and Co. of many major
home appliances marketed under the Kenmore brand name.
Industry:
Approximately 120 million home appliances are sold in
developed countries each year (Weiss, D.D. & Gross, A.C.,
1995). The appliance industry is generally classified into four
categories: laundry, refrigeration, cooking, and other
appliances. Appliances are constructed in capital intensive
plants, and design usually varies among countries and regions.
For years, almost all appliance industry participants were
executing similar strategies that focused on lowering the cost
and improving the quality of products, while expanding
distribution and increasing the competitive share of display
space on the retail floor.In a Harvard Business Review article
in 1994 called "The Right Way to Go Global," David
Whitwam, Whirlpool's CEO, described the competitive
situation that existed in the early 1990s:
"Even though w'e had drcamatically lowered costs and
improved product qualily, our profil margins in North A inerica
had been declining hecause everyone in the industry wias
pursuing the same course and the local market was mature.
The fiur main players-Whirlpool, General Electric, Afaytag,
and White Consolidated, which had been acquired by
Electrolux-were hewing one (nother up ev'eryday.
Current Context:
As a response to this, in 1989, the company embarked on a
vision to globalize Whirlpool, with the objective of becoming
the world market leader in home appliances. The company now
considers itself a truly global integrated enterprise with an
impressive global market position - apparently 40% larger than
the closest competitor with over 60,000 employees worldwide.
The globalization process however has come at a cost.
Beginning with the purchase of a majority stake in an appliance
company owned by Philips, the Dutch electronics firm,
Whirlpool purchased a majority stake in an Indian firm,
established four joint ventures in China, and made significant
new investments in its Latin America operations. However, by
the mid-1990s, serious problems had emerged in the
company's international operations. In 1995, Whirlpool's
European profit fell by 50% and in 1996, the company reported
a $13 million loss in Europe. In Asia, the situation was even
worse. Although the region accounted for only 6% of corporate
sales, Whirlpool lost $70 million in Asia in 1996 and $62
million in 1997. Despite the company's investments of
hundreds of millions of dollars throughout the 1990s to
modernize operations in Brazil, appliance sales plummeted
there by 25% in 1998. Whirlpool expected that 1999 would be
the third straight year of declining sales for the Brazilian
subsidiary (Martin, Algar & Kumar, 2000). In response to these
problems, Whirlpool began a global restructuring effort. In
September 1997, the company announced that it would cut
10% of its global workforce over the next two years and pull
out of two joint ventures in China. In announcing the cuts,
Whirlpool's CEO David Whitwam said, "We (ire taking steps
to align the organization with the marketplace realities of our
industry. " (Quintanilla & Carlton, 1997) Entering the year of
2001, the company faced difficult economic circumstances and
weakening markets around the world. In December 2000,
Whirlpool announced a $300 million to $350 million
restructuring effort to improve the competitive position of our
global operations, given the new realities within these markets.
(Annual report 2001)
Following the optimism of the early 1990s, something clearly
went wrong with Whirlpool's global strategy, some suggesting
that perhaps the company was overly ambitious. Despite
Whitwam's insightful and optimistic comments to the Harvard
Business Review (March/April, 1994), perhaps there was really
a lack of understanding about how to create an integrated
global strategy. Others suggest that the problems were the
result of changes in the competitive and economic
environments in Europe, Asia, and Latin America.
Given Whirlpool's poor showing in the earlier phases of its
globalization plan, it still has far to go in convincing the many
skeptics and disappointed shareholders that globalization was
the best strategy. Many analysts were unsure whether
Whirlpool's self-confidence was actually deserved or if it was
little more than self-delusion.
Company Profile:
Overall corporate strategy:
"to be one companj iorldwide"
- David Whitwam, Whirlpool's CEO, Harvard Business Review, 1994
The company's overarching objective is to drive the company
to world-class performance in terms of delivering shareholder
value, which we define as being in the top 25% of publicly
held companies in total returns through a given economic
cycle. This is supported by a market philosophy which suggests
that the only way to deliver such value over the long term is by
focusing on the customer. The company believes that only
prolonged, intensive effort to understand and respond to
genuine customer needs can lead to the innovative products
and services that earn long-term customer loyalty.
Corporate real estate strategy:
"to maximize shareholder value and align the real estate
portfolio as cfficiently as wve can
to the operational needs ofthe corporation"
- Carl Nedderman, interview
This basis drives the company to identify what properties are
core vs non core and be sure that an exit strategy is in place for
those that are non core. The strategic focus appears to be
primarily dynamic in nature with the identification and disposal
of excess properties in a timely fashion also important. The
company's strategy is also primarily related to business unit
100
requirements, with cost competitiveness and worker
requirements being emphasized. The corporate real estate team
is also seen as an integral part of the capacity planning process
and work very closely with individual business units in order to
assess real estate needs. The team challenges many of the
assumptions determined by a specific business unit
Other real estate related business objectives: (Source: Jones
Lang LaSalle)
o Optimize (from the perspective of shareholders) the
balance-sheet impact of real estate decisions
o Minimize debt rating impact
o Reduce corporate tax rates
o Unlock capital (to reinvest in the business, reduce
debt, etc.) sooner rather than later
o Support corporate objectives of higher growth and
improved returns
o Resolve differences between business unit
" P&L impacts and the EVA business model
o Maximize occupancy flexibility while addressing
asset-specific control issues
* Real Estate Operating Decisions:
"We try and actively participate in the business planning
process to ver/fp and challenge various assumptions as to
why where the business unit needs thespace "
- Lee Utke, Real Estate Asset Manager - Global Assets
Once the space need has been established by the business unit
and this has been approved by senior management, the real
estate group takes full control of the process, again working
very closely with the business unit to establish the details of
their requirements within the broader space need envelope.
With the aid of real estate advisory firm Jones Lang LaSalle a
review is then conducted of various potential regions in order
to determine which has the most appropriate demographic
characteristics and real estate risk profile in relation to the
specific operation. Other issues which are also considered
include logistics transportation models in order to determine
the cost effectiveness of one location versus another. In
reviewing the competitiveness of various location alternatives,
state and provincial incentive programs are also considered
before work is pursued with a variety of different developers.
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One slightly atypical aspect of the Whirlpool approach is the
fact that all development projects on done on a typical lease
structure with a purchase option. The option being exercisable
within 60 days of the completion of construction, giving the
group more opportunity to fully research the dynamics of the
local market, to evaluate the residual risk profile that is
established for the particular asset and to ensure that the quality
of the construction is consistent with the company's high
standards.
* Financial structuring alternatives:
Ofhlance sheet financing is not something that we go afier
or are willing to pay a premium for... we have looked at and
used synthetic leasing, but in today 's environment all of that is
a nasty word. We are really down to a traditional operating
lease or a huy, recognizing that the traditional operating lease
is going to cost its monej.
- Frank Luongo, Director, Treasury Operations The Americas.
Despite the apparent bias by Whirlpool in favor of direct
ownership from a cost point of view, in market value terms the
company's portfolio is divided 50/50 between ownership and
leasing. In terms of square footage that metric changes to
approximately 60% owned and 4 0% leased. The ability to lease
an asset is certainly considered favorable when an asset is
considered non-core and flexibility is paramount. Luongo goes
further to suggest that this weighting between ownership and
leasing is highly correlated to the company's core/non core
asset metric.
What also became apparent though is that the weighting is very
much dependant on two issues: one, on the competitive
environment specific to the company's industry, and two, the
level of the company's overall development or maturity. For
instance, a portfolio weighted 80/20 in favor of ownership may
be appropriate in one industry while not the other, depending
primarily on the nature of the business and it's immediate
competitive environment. Also, a growing company with
unpredictable space needs and a relatively higher beta will
most likely place an emphasis on leasing. What is clear from
this is that apples to apples comparisons across industries and
companies are therefore very difflcult.
Following this discussion it was clear that Whirlpool considers
itself a well established organization with relatively stable cash
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flows. Discussion suggested that the approximate 50/50
portfolio mix of ownership to leasing (in market value terms) is
appropriate for their line of business at this specific point in
time. This is a dynamic metric and though should change in the
immediate future depending mainly on competitive demands of
the overall and industry specific environment.
The spectrum of financing alternatives are primarily viewed by
the company as different cost structure alternatives, with the
company basically paying a premium for operational flexibility
afforded by leasing. The interviewees did not recognize the
alternatives as a means for the company to control the amount
of risk that it is exposing itself to. What did appear to be clearly
understood however is the ability of different alternatives to
transfer or mitigate different types of risk.
The decision drivers:
The discussion of these drivers will be focused in primarily two
parts: those that were considered prior to the implementation of
the JLL model and those considered post. The JLL/Whirlpool
Model:
Quantitative Measures:
Cash flow:
* Net Present Value after
tax
Balance-Sheet Impact:
" Total debt to capital
" Capital requirement
P&L Impact
* Earnings impacts
* Five year average
GAAP income
Credit Risk
* EBIT/EBITDA Interest
Coverage
* Free Cash Flows
* Funds from
operations/Total debt
Profitability Ratios
* EPS on a diluted basis
* Operating Profit/Net
Sales
" ROA
* ROE
* Return on Total Capital
Qualitative Measures:
Strategic Importance:
0 Core
* Non-core
Property Considerations:
" Facility Size
" Replacement cost
" Degree of Company
Specific TIs
" Market
Value/Replacement
Cost
Operations Issues
" Length of
Commitment
* Certainty of
Occupancy
* Flexibility
Market Issues
* Market Size
* Supply & Demand
* Value and rent trends
* Economic growth
Other considerations
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Prior to the development of the model only one driver was
primarily used in assessing the merit of various financing
alternatives: the net present value cost. This inevitably resulted
in an ownership position being favored but with a very high
dependency on the assumptions that were made going into the
calculation. Assumptions such as the appropriate cost of
capital, exchange rate assumptions and residual value
assessment also varied widely depending on what region the
analysis was being carried out in. As Lee Utke suggested, "You
would see results, but you didn't have comfort in the
assumptions that were used to produce the results". The actual
mechanics of the own vs lease decision are seen as simple to
teach but of utmost importance is the assumptions made in
developing that model.
The company also faced global consistency issues with their
previous decision making process:
" Prior to the implementation of the Jones Lange LaSalle
model, decisions iere niade more regionally than on a
global basis, so you had no homogenous way of running
the models " - Carl Nedderman, interview.
From JLL's perspective the decision making process prior to
the implementation of the model also supported this notion:
"The analysis offixed-asselfinancing varied iidely, producing
certain inconsistencies around the world. Analysis conducted
in one market was likely to he different from that completed in
another, often iith different assumptions employed.
Consequently, comparing individual decisions was difficult,
thus limiting the collective impact of real estate decisions on
the financial and strategic health ofthe con)any.
The relative importance or weighting of the drivers is a
dynamic metric which changes according to business
conditions. The actual determination of the weighting is
however seen as having the important functional objective of
gaining consensus from senior management as to what is really
important. What was agreed is that the financing decision
making process is essentially a trade off between cost and
flexibility.
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This was elaborated on by Utke:
"the speed at which real es/ale requirements are changing and
balancing those needs against a longer term real estate
solution representing the least amount ofcost.
For the perspective of the business unit there was a general
tendency to drive the solution towards the absolute lowest
operating cost structure that they can find with the full
knowledge that from an operating point of view in 4-5 years
time might need to be in something totally different.
What is clear is that the individual role players do place an
emphasis on different drivers. For instance:
Frank Luongo, Director, Treasury Operations The
Americas: cost is still the primary concern. However
the decision would not be made without looking at the
"type" of asset under consideration. For instance for a
non-core asset the cost would not necessarily be the
driver. In this case the treasury is thinking in terms of
what premium the company should be willing to pay
for a non core asset - since leasing is more expensive
that owning. Important to realize however is the view
that the notion of core vs non core assets should not be
defined by the length of the need, but related to the
strategic importance of the asset relative to the
company's core competency.
* Lee Utke, Real Estate Asset Manager - Global Assets:
a similar focus to the interests of the treasury, however
a more significant emphasis is placed on the residual
value issues tied to the particular asset. Before any
decisions are made, the goal is to understand the
residual risks associated with the asset both from an
investors perspective and from a corporate perspective.
* Carl Nedderman, Director, Corporate Real Estate:
determining whether the asset is core or non core and
thinking carefully about how much flexibility is
required appeared to be a major emphasis. In this case
the notion of "flexibility" however is primarily tied to
the exit strategy related to the asset and is of particular
importance if the asset is non core.
Once consensus is reached, the consistency of the output from
the model can be used to track, historically and going forward,
how different alternatives arc being measured thus allowing an
apples-to-apples comparison.
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The company's perspective on financial reporting issues was
very interesting:
"On-balance-sheet vs offlbalance-sheet: that has never
been important thing for us. " - Frank Luongo.
It was felt that the emphasis placed on financial reporting
issues will obviously vary from company to company and is
primarily a function of how clean the company's balance sheet
already is and the company's ability to handle additional
balance sheet "explosion". Whirlpool regards itself as a
conservative company and off-balance sheet funding is not
something that the group is willing to pay a premium for.
In terms of sourcing funding for both lease and ownership
obligations the company's cost of debt is considered to be the
appropriate cost of capital. For valuation purposes the company
makes the assumption on the front end that whatever capital
commitment will be required is match funded in the capital
markets. For instance, a 10 year capital commitment will be
assessed in terms of the 10yr cost of capital to the corporation.
In reality however the commitment is funded through short
term commercial paper since this is currently viewed as a very
cheap source of funding. From the treasur-y's point of view the
extent of short term funding is essentially governed by the ratio
of fixed rate debt to floating rate debt on the company's books.
Luongo reiterated that it is really immaterial whether the
floating rate debt is supporting a new building, product or
payroll:
we are managing the fixedfloating raio and not the
underlying asset.
Should company's be disgorging their real estate assets since it
is harmful to commit scarce capital to investments outside their
core competencies? Well that depends on your view of capital
according to the team at Whirlpool. A lease that the company
has committed itself to for 15 years is still capital - it is still
regarded as a long term capital commitment. While some make
the argument that the company should look to minimize the
amount of real estate on the balance sheet in order to make it
look cleaner, according to Frank Luongo:
"the reality is that you have offhalance sheet activity that you
internally do know about, and it'sYjust as ugly. "
The shareholder may not see those commitments, but given
what has recently happened with Worldcom and Enron, there is
clearly a move today towards minimizing information which is
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'hid' from the shareholder creating pressure for corporations to
disclose more and more information.
One of the interesting issues raised which has not been
addressed previously in this inquiry was the idea of "limiting
factors". This was well framed by Frank Luongo:
"There could he limitingfactors outside everything which
makes common sense which may upset the decision.....we will
make a non-economic decision because ofthe limiting.factor,
which really is then destroying shareholders value and not
adding to it. "
So even though it may make total sense in every way for the
company to select a specific financing alternative, they may not
actually have the choice. Certain externalities to the immediate
decision process may in fact govern what is possible and what
is not. For Whirlpool one of the biggest limiting factors is the
company's capital budget. Comparing the merits of various
alternatives through the use of their model is all well and good,
however the bottom line is if there is no capital available the
model simply indicates what the premium will be to lease. This
was one of the primary motivations for developing the model:
to fully understand what specific premium the company was
paying to lease space in a particular situation.
As the company evolved into a major global business, the
acquisition of fixed assets -particularly real estate, one of the
company's largest categories of capital assets- became a
major balance-sheet component. Given the magnitude of these
assets and increased pressure on all corporations to enhance
balance-sheet performance, Whirlpool looked for ways to
elevate its already leading edge financial processes to ensure
that decisions about the financing of real estate not only reflect
the optimal balance-sheet structure but also address critical
operational requirements.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
CASE STUDY 2: SUN MICROSYSTEMS
"Sun, another pursuer of agility.. .on an average day,
12,000 Sun employees do not 'show up'for work"
- MIT Gartner documenting Sun's iWork initiative
With the help of Jones Lange LaSalle, Sun Microsystems, Inc.
kindly granted access to Bob Cooke, Manager of Strategic and
Financial Planning.
This case outlines the decision making process of a company
whose phenomenal growth strategy over the past decade has
now given way to a more complex, thoughtful, value-based
strategy, as scale and market certainty have increased and
forecasting horizons lengthened.
Perhaps most remarkable about the Sun case is the company's
drive to enable agility through its i Work concept stemmed from
its realization that the work that needed to be done was not
easily housed in geographically designated, discrete facilities,
no matter how adaptive those facilities might be. The company
recognized that its notion of the workplace was limited: people
were working where the work demanded they should be. The
anytime/anywhere mantra of iVWork is essentially about
creating a support system that takes advantage of both the work
that needs doing and the tools available to do it.
Company Overview:
Sun was founded with one driving vision: a vision of
computers that talk to each other no matter who built them.
Since its inception in 1982, their singular vision - The Network
is The Computer[tm] - has propelled Sun Microsystems, Inc. to
its position as a leading provider of industrial-strength
hardware, software, and services for establishing enterprise-
wide intranets and expanding the Internet. A vision focused on
making technology work for the customer, not the other way
around. While others protected proprietary, stand-alone
architectures, Sun focused on taking companies into the
network age, providing systems and software with the
scalability and reliability needed to drive the electronic
marketplace.
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Industry:
Sun faces strong competition from HP and IBM in the high end
of the microelectronics, software and service market, and from
the Wintel camp in lower end servers and Internet standards
but its strong corporate identity, technologies and alliances
(AOL/Netscape, IBM) are competitive advantages, particularly
in the Internet market. Sun believes that its strength in core
industries, coupled with its strong platform technology is
expanding its opportunities in new markets related to the
Internet such as ecommerce, digital media management,
internet service providers and application service providers.
Current Context:
Founded in 1982 by three Stanford University graduate
students, Sun Microsystems, Inc. (SMI), the company has
grown from designing and assembling UNIX-based networked
workstations and servers to the development of operating
system software, silicon designs, and other technologies, as
well as providing services to its growing customer base. Sun's
first product was a new kind of computer known as a technical
workstation. It could outperform personal computers in speed,
capacity, and the ability to display graphics. Most importantly
however, the workstations could be networked together to
produce as much computing power as a mainframe at
significantly lower cost.
Initially, Sun licensed its technology, for little or no cost, to
encourage selection by the widest range of vendors. The
company also targeted aggressive growth based on best-of-
breed products rather than first-to market offerings. By 1988,
Sun's open-system strategy had established new software
industry standards and annual sales reached $1 billion. By
1991, the company had captured nearly 40 percent of the
worldwide workstation and server market, expanding to $3.2
billion in revenues. (Lambert & Poteete, 2000)
By 1995, annual sales revenues had reached $6 billion, with
enterprise users purchasing $2 billion of products, 75 percent
of new sales that year. (Lambert & Poteete, 2000) Sun
maintained leadership in the dynamic microelectronics
industry, where extremely short product cycle times were the
norm, by offering a continual stream of innovative products.
JAVA, Sun's new programming language, heightened
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company visibility when it emerged as the de facto standard for
corporate open network computing.
Sun's motto of "the network is the computer " which has
guided the company for a decade, was joined by a new slogan
we put the dot on 'dot. com '". This slogan emphasizes Sun's
strategy of providing core technologies (servers, Solaris, Java)
and setting standards (Java and Jini) to run the Internet. Sun
has repositioned itself away from the slow-growth workstation
market and toward the high-growth Internet market, and its
servers run high-profile web sites such as AOL, Amazon.com
and c-bay. With offices in 170 countries, Sun is now a $18.25
billion global leader in network computing solutions that "Take
it to the nth."
Company Profile:
* Overall corporate strategy:
"Sun is a relentless innovator. Sun has a /9-year history of
bringing innovative ideas to market with practical results
for our customers. Becaase ie build fbrward-thinking
technology, we enable our castomers to get the most out of
their existing network environments and take advantage of
fture op)ortunities. - Sun honepage.
Sun sees itself as one of the world's top providers of network
computing solutions--not only to the networked enterprise, but
to networked consumers and to networked customers, suppliers
and partners. The company has been described by a board
member as "the last standing, u'lly integrated conimputing
conI)any." (Schlender, 1997) It is a vertically integrated
computer company that does everything from manufacture of
microprocessors to operating systems, to computer systems to
applications to distribution to customer service and support.
Sun reportedly strives to differentiate its products on two or
three key dimensions on which it is leading edge and to
compete on cost and quality on all others. Although these vary
over time, Sun pursues three product differentiators: Open
systems, scalability & proprietary Sun technologies.
1 10
* Corporate real estate strategy:
"Moving towards a total solution 1o provide workplaces to our
)cople "
- Bob Cooke, interview.
Central to this strategy is an initiative called "iwork" which in
its purest form involves providing a series of work places for
employees to allow them the flexibility of working anywhere at
any point in time. The notion of place has thus been separated
from work with many of the employees not being assigned to a
particular workplace. The employee is given the flexibility to
work in a variety of spaces within a particular campus or
around the world. The corporate real estate strategy is thus
focused on providing the company's workers with this
flexibility to work wherever and whenever they may need to
work.
* Real estate operating decisions:
The workplace resources group helps the individual business
units in assessing their expected future need for space. This is
done comprehensively around the world, for all business units.
This demand forecast, which typically goes out around three
years, is then compared to what resources exist in the particular
geographies with the hope of identifying where the needs are
most likely to be. The workplace resources group then
develops a plan with the objective of bridging those expected
needs. This is not a business unit specific process - the
portfolio is seen as providing a complete workplace solution
within which the business units have the freedom to operate.
However the specific business units involved do need to
formally approve the proposed workplace plans because
ultimately each unit is charged for its real estate usage. The
workplace resources group itself does not hold any budget - all
costs are charged through to the business units and the group
works with the business units as their main client.
The primary players involved in the process of making the
decision to own an asset is the vice president of workplace
resources who essentially proposes a course of action which is
then endorsed by the CFO and passed to the CEO and senior
management for approval. Since the campus strategy is to
provide a total workplace solution which will serve the
common community, the business units themselves are
typically not involved in this specific part of the decision
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making process. The entire real estate portfolio is seen as a
single solution focusing on providing flexibility to the various
business units within which they have freedom to operate.
0 Financing alternatives:
In vast majority of cases Sun chooses to lease its sales and
service offices. In this case leasing is seen as really the only
practical alternative since the company is in 180 cities around
the world and in most cases the specific space requirement is
just not large enough to consider owning the asset. Furthermore
business requirements have historically been extremely
uncertain, particularly when the company was in its high
growth stage. The local market typically determines the
specific terms of the leasing agreement, but there is the overall
tendency for the lease to be structured as triple net.
Sun does however consider owning assets in locations where
there is a significant space need which is certain for some time.
In order to accommodate these growing needs the company
initiated a self-development program about 6 or 7 years ago
which was an aggressive strategy to acquire sites and build
campuses. Sun believes that it has benefited from this program
of buying large pieces of land and growing into them over time
to form large consolidated campuses in the region of I million
to 1.5 million square feet. Had the company relied on the
market to provide leased space, growth would have been very
expensive and operations would now be very scattered. The
consolidation of space in the form of campuses has yielded
significant agglomeration benefits in terms of communication
and the provision of workforce amenities. Cooke also
suggested that the campuses had certainly given Sun a
competitive advantage in attracting highly talented employees.
On the ownership side, assets have typically been directly
funded through cash. The use of cash being primarily
motivated by leverage concerns. Sun, particularly during its
growth phase, generates vast amounts of cash so scarcity of
capital is not a major concern. The company believes that since
it is in a highly volatile industry it is very important to maintain
a conservative balance sheet in terms of leverage. To give an
indication, the company currently has approximately only $1
billion in debt and $6 billion in cash! Bearing in mind that this
is a tech company, the total real estate holdings are however
seen as being too insignificant to alter the overall riskiness
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associated with the company's cash flows. Following on from
this, how does the company feel about investing shareholder's
cash in lower yielding real estate assets? Well, for now cash
isn't scarce and they would prefer putting it in real estate as
opposed to say buying back stock. Sun has never made use of
the synthetic leasing alternative. This choice was driven
primarily by the already complex nature of the IT industry and
also a desire to avoid any doubts being cast over the integrity
of the company's financial statements.
In terms of the actual number of locations, the company
predominantly leases its space. However, in terms of square
footage, the overall portfolio is split 50/50 between ownership
and leasing.
0 Decision drivers:
It is clear that size plays a major role in determining the
appropriate financing alternative. The decision to own the
campuses was however not only driven by their sheer size.
Again the idea of core and non-core assets was mentioned. The
fact that the campuses are seen as being crucial to providing
long term support to the company's core competency is also a
significant driver in making the decision to own. Another
interesting issue raised was the idea that leasing such large
premises would result in an owner/investor factoring in a
premium to compensate him/her for the additional default risk
of leasing to a large single tenant. So from an economic
efficiency point of view it certainly makes more sense for Sun
to own.
Financial reporting has become more of an issue in the recent
past but still is not considered a major driver in making the
decision. Reporting issues are certainly considered subordinate
to the incremental cash effects tied to the occupancy costs
associated with a specific alternative. It is recognized that
ownership typically is the lower cost option - depending to a
large extent on the residual value which is assumed in the
calculation.
Sun does make use of a designated financial analysis
methodology which assesses the quantitative implications of
various financing alternatives. This however does not consider
the qualitative drivers implicit in the process. The financial
model is used as a screen to determine what the possibilities
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are. These are then considered relative to their qualitative
merit.
It appears that for Sun the major issue driving the financing
decision is in fact size. Bob Cooke tied this directly to the fact
that large assets representing significant infrastructure
investments are likely to be core to Sun's primary business.
The smaller sales and service offices which are spread around
the world are leased primarily since it is impractical to pursue
anything otherwise. The assets are seen as being too small and
their needs are also constantly changing.
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CHAPTER NINE
CASE STUDY 3: CHARLES SCHWAB
"To provide the most useful and ethicalfinancial services in
the world"
- Charles Schwab hornepage.
Patrick Walt, Director of Corporate Real Estate Transactions,
kindly agreed to be interviewed and provide input to this
discussion.
Company Overview:
The Charles Schwab Corporation is one of the nation's largest
financial services firms engaged, through its subsidiaries, in
providing securities brokerage and related financial services for
over 7.9 million active accounts. The company's clients
include domestic and international individual investors,
independent investment managers, institutions, broker-dealers
and 401(k) plan sponsors.
Industry:
"Financial services is a particularly competitive industry and
we need to run exceptionally lean.
We needed a more complete solution to reach our cost
reduction targets. "
-Beverly Mackey Vice President of Procurement
Today's financial services industry is being shaped
dramatically by globalization, changing demographics, new
competition and the use of technology. These forces combined
with extraordinary merger and acquisition activity, mean
financial institutions must move quickly to harness technology
to operate more efficiently, reduce costs, leverage their
combined assets and communicate effectively with business
partners. To remain ahead of the competition, they must
anticipate and meet client demand for new products and
services.
Current Context:
Charles R. Schwab founded the company bearing his name in
California in 1971 as a brokerage firm helping individual
investors trade stocks and bonds. Schwab understood that the
bundling of transaction services and advice increased the costs
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to savvy investors who felt comfortable making their own
investment decisions. Following the deregulation of brokerage
commissions, Schwab decided that unlike full-service firms,
his company would not sell advice to customers on what and
when to trade. Instead, Schwab focused on providing investors
low-cost execution services, becoming the first broker to
discount commissions.
In the mid-90's, Schwab's mission started to broaden. First, the
firm adopted a global orientation, revising its original mission
"to provide customers with the most useful and ethical
financial services in the world." (Schwab Annual Report, 1995)
By 2000, Schwab operated in Australia, Canada, the U.K.,
Hong Kong, Japan and Brazil. Second, Schwab realized that a
new oeneration of investors was in need of help in making
investment decisions. Whereas in 1987, only 5% of Schwab's
customers did not have prior investment experience, in the
1990's this figure grew to about 50%. To serve this new market
and to improve its services, Schwab started to develop new
tools, products and services. This strategy also helped the firm
to retain its existing customer base: as investors age and grow
wealthier, they demand more attention and service.
On December 28, 1998, the market capitalization of Charles
Schwab Corporation topped that of brokerage giant Merrill
Lynch, soaring on market enthusiasm about the Internet. The
company had come a long way from its early years, when
founder Charles R. "Chuck" Schwab "bet the company" on
information technology (IT), spending two million dollars -
equivalent to the company's entire net worth - to buy an IBM
mainframe. Early and large IT investments gave Schwab a
technological edge in an industry that thrives on information.
Schwab took advantage of its San Francisco location, just a
few miles north of Silicon Valley, which was inventing the
future of technology, and of management.
Schwab now considers itself a full service brokerage company,
as opposed to just a discount broker. By the end of 2000, the
company had captured over half of the discount brokerage
market, having amassed 7.5 million active customer accounts
wvith $872 billion in assets through 384 domestic branch
offices, and net income of $718 million on revenues of $5.79
billion
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Company Profile:
* Overall corporate strategy:
We are a technology company in the brokerage business.
-David S. Pottruck, President & Co-Chief Executive Officer, Charles
Schwab
Schwab's primary focus is on serving individual investors,
providing them a wide selection of brokerage and investment
services at prices that are substantially lower than those of full-
service firms. Since the seventies, Schwab's primary mission
has been "to provide investors with the most useful and ethical
brokerage services in America." (Schwab Annual Report,
1991) Traditionally, Schwab has appealed to "take-charge"
investors who are highly educated, technology-literate,
comfortable trading securities without advice, and in search of
low prices.
Since day one, Schwab has been focused on demystifying
investing. In doing so, the company has defined a simple
approach: "no sales pressure, no high commissions, no hidden
ftees, and no conflict of interest because our representatives'
compensation doesn't depend on which product is sold. "
Rather, the company focuses on providing unbiased guidance
and advice. "We objectively evaluate a client's investment
goals, and suggest sound solutions to meet those goals.
Corporate real estate strategy:
Our overarching goal is to make sure that we met the
corporate objective ofalways being able to
provide service to our customers.. particularly our online
customers. "
- Patrick Walt, Director of Corporate Real Estate Transactions
To accommodate tremendous growth in sales and service staff,
both domestically and abroad, Charles Schwab & Company's
CRE unit developed rolling global real estate master plans.
(Lambert & Poteete, 2000) Because information about future
company growth is by its nature imprecise, corporate real
estate plans were based on three-year business growth
projections and included alternative scenarios reflecting cost
minimization strategies tied to variable space demand
forecasts. This strategic focus is supported by interviews
comments made by Patrick Walt:
"Since Schwab's growth was expected to be very dramatic for
the coming years, our main concern became how do ie
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continue to provide that level ofservice... we need to make sure
that we continue have the capabilities to svpport that growth."
The company thus adopted the strategy of securing entire
campuses through a series of rights (options) but not
obligations to support their expected growth. Prior to having
command of an entire campus the company is extremely
careful about ensuring that this commitment is well supported
by and coordinated with the perceived demographics of the
area. Selection of campus locations is thus primarily driven by
demographic concerns. The group seems to clearly understand
the need for an absolute cross section of all demographic
factors. This commitment to demographics is supported by a
four-point framework, developed by real estate and facilities in
1996 to help ensure quality and responsiveness in its core
business services. This involved focusing on: 1) the cost of
doing business, such as taxes, real estate costs, and available
economic incentives; 2) the available talent pool, including its
size and educational profile; 3) the quality of life at the
location; and 4) specific business drivers, among them time
zone differentials, customer proximity, competitor locations,
and direct air links. (Lambert & Poteete, 2000)
In Lambert & Potecte's project "Managing Global Real
Estate", Parkash Ahuja, senior vice president of corporate
administrative services, is quoted:
"Every square inch ofspace costs money to the co mpany. We
don 't want any vacant space. But w'e also don't want space to
become a critical item in terms of/the co mpany 's growth. We
nust balance these two extremes through the Irocess of
)lanning which helps us analyze space demand andsupply
categorically. "
It seems that, similar to the objectives of the Whirlpool
Corporation, creating and maintaining a corporate
infrastructure to optimize operational effectiveness is a primary
focus of the Schwab's real estate strategy.
0 Real estate operating decisions:
In terms of the process underlying the origin of space needs,
the individual business units will generally have a coordinated
message which is established with the help of people such as
Parkash Ahuja. This message is then passed onto the Senior
Vice President of Real Estate and transferred to the vice
presidents. The various players within corporate real estate will
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then be expected to accommodate the overall space needs and
growth of the company. Within the group, the Vice President
of Planning maintains constant communication with the
business units to determine what their growth needs are, this
may involve tweaking a requirement locally or adding a
strategic play in a new market place which again based on
primarily on demographics. Once the space need has been
determined, this is passed onto Walt for implementation.
* Financing alternatives:
With respect to the ownership percentage in Schwab inventory,
approximately 13.7% (1,249,389 Rentable Square Feet
owned/9,117,282 Total Schwab inventory) is owned. Almost
all of this owned space is for Data Centers across the country.
Apart form the data centers Schwab does not own many of its
assets at all. The company does however currently hold a
synthetic lease on a 380,000 square foot office premises in San
Francisco. The reason however for structuring the financing of
the particular asset in this was primarily as a function of the
overpriced nature of the booming market at the time of the
acquisition. Rental rates had risen to more than $100 per square
foot and the synthetic alternative was seen as a way to lock in
an acceptable short term rental rate, obviously benchmarked to
LIBOR. The company chose not to cap its exposure to LIBOR
and with the recent fall in LIBOR the company is now only
paying 40% to 60% of the financing cost that was initially
budgeted. The company also controls one of its primary office
assets through a bond net lease, locked in at a very favorable
rental rate which has worked out well for the company.
By far the majority of the portfolio is therefore leased. The
company takes great care to ensure that the leases are operating
and not capital leases in order to maintain a clean balance
sheet.
* Decision drivers:
"Our overall goal is to control real es/ae... coining and going
we wanh to have absoliute niaxinmlun control...
we will try and have it every which way that we can
- Patrick Walt, interview
In order to maximize control, when structuring a lease
agreement, the company typically aims to have as longer
control over the asset as FASB 13 will allow. This typically
involves a series of options to either renew or purchase. The
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exit strategy is then ensured through with certain termination
and cancellation rights being negotiated. The company
generally wants to avoid the obligations of title and ownership.
What they are interested in is the option of ownership via a
long term lease with options to purchase. "Ownership" at the
end of the day is important to the company purely from a
control point of view. Again control appears to be paramount,
yet the company believes that through careful negotiation it can
gain comfort in the amount of control that they have over a
particular asset structuring the terms of a long term lease
agreement.
Another reason for favoring leasing to such an extent?
'It has a lot to do with optimizing our balance sheet - we
just do not want to carry all this real estate on our
financials.....we don't want to be seen to be putting our
money in the wrong place. " - Patrick Walt, interview
So, the idea of capital allocation is also a big part of the reason.
Beyond financial reporting and capital allocation concerns
once various alternatives have passed the rigorous
demographics and other screening processes it is about finding
the asset that offers the most flexibility and is competitive from
a cost point of view. i.e.:
"what is going to give us the biggest hangfbr our buck and
what will allow the most operationalflexibility... our
operational flexibilitY needs to be commensurate with our
overall corporate objectivesfor staying as lean and as mean as
possible. " - Patrick Walt, interview
From a cost point of view however, ownership is not seen as
being typically cheaper than leasing. Walt suggested that an
apples to apples comparison in their case is very difficult to
make since the lease agreements are normally structured with
various forms of options to renew. So there is uncertainty with
regards to the term of the capital commitment. On the issue of
core vs non-core Schwab does have a rating system which
determines the reliability required for the support of various
systems. i.e. call centers and data centers will require
substantially more reliability than an administrative function
which will feature lower on the spectrum. On the leasing side
it is felt that many landlords have been very slow to really
understand Schwabs space, technology and infrastructure
needs.
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CHAPTER TEN
CONCLUSION
Despite Modigliani & Miller's assertion that financing
decisions are irrelevant, this thesis has clearly illustrated that
companies do face real trade-offs in deciding how they finance
these real estate investments. This certainly implies a belief in
relatively inefficient markets on behalf of senior management.
For reasons of focus, the financing decision has been viewed as
separate from the space need or real estate operating decision.
Notwithstanding the need to customize these operating
decisions on behalf of the business unit customers and to
ensure that the decisions are economically sound within a
given region, a wide spectrum of factors that drive real estate
financing decisions have thus been explored. These decision
drivers were divided into quantitative and qualitative factors
and analyzed in relation to the broad spectrum of financing
alternatives available. A comprehensive framework of drivers
was then derived in order to assist real estate decisionmakers in
gathering the relevant information needed to evaluate the
overall effectiveness and trade-offs associated with each
alternative.
This framework of thought was then applied to series of case
studies in order to assess it's relevance. From a broader
perspective it was clear that optimal financing decisions:
* Clearly reflect the financial and operational requirements of
both the company and business units;
* Are very much a function of the larger portfolio wide
corporate real estate strategy, which is in turn closely allied
to the company's overall corporate strategy;
* Take into account the perspectives of other role players
(IT,HR, Finance) in the decision making process.
In terms of the relative importance of the specific drivers
themselves it is clear that:
* The strategic importance of an asset to the company's core
business is often the overriding concern in making the
financing decision. This is seen as a way in which to
maintain a comfortable degree of control over the asset.
" Once the strategic importance of an asset is established and
a required level of control thus ascertained, decision
makers typically seek to then maximize of the amount of
flexibility within these strategic/control parameters. This
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typically involves a simple trade off: "we understand that
leasing is more expensive than owning for the primary
reason that is affords us more operational flexibility. The
decision that we are thus essentially faced with is how
much of a premium are we willing to pay for that additional
flexibility?"
The importance of financial reporting in the context of the
real estate financing decision is very much tied to the
overall importance placed on reporting in the broader
corporate context. It is not real estate specific. For some
companies, financial reporting appears to be a major issue,
for some apparently not. These perspectives appear to be
primarily a function of the companies ability to effectively
manage' it's balance sheet.
* The idea of "limiting factors" was also mentioned. To
quote the Whirlpool team:
"There could he limitingfactors outside eierything which
makes commion sense which may upset the decision.....we will
make a non-economlic decision because ofthe liniting factor,
which really is then destroying shareholders value and not
adding to it."
There certainly does exist the possibility of random and
unexpected 'limiting factors' which will determine the
financing outcome despite all other logical parameters
suggesting the contrary. In this case maybe M&M are right
afterall - maybe the financing decision is irrelevant? This
would however appear to be more the exception than the
rule.
Despite such a limited sample size, it is resoundingly clear that
companies do recognize significant trade-offs in making the
financing decision. Recognition of these trade-offs certainly
does imply a belief in inefficient markets and a belief that
corporate real estate financing decisions are indeed relevant.
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX
ABC Enterprises Inc. - Impact of Direct Corporate Funding on Consolidated Financial Statements
Balance Sheet Equation:
sh AIR -ADA INV
12,000 10,000 (1,000) 3,000
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(800) 800
37.500 (37.500)
(11,000)
15,000
(14,500)
(8,750)
(1,800)
(4.750)
(346)
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1,400
(8,800)
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(1,125)
(1.000)
PPINS Land Machinery - Acc Dep Bdg - Acc Dep Patent = A/P
2,000 20,000 8,000 (2,000) 30,000 (1,200) 8,000 =
= 15,000
= (14,500)
(1,000)
2,500
(2,1300) 500
(1,000)
Acc/P Inc Tax/P Div/P Bonds/P -Disc B/P Corn Stock Add P- Cap RE
8,000 1,500 500 1,000 25,000 (2,000) 32,000
8,000
(8,750)
5,568
(4,750)
(600)
(500)
(1.000)
(1,000) 2000
6.330 13.700 (1.700) 7,000 1,000 21,936 8,500 (2,500) 38,147 (2,005) 7,500 8,500 750 1,318 3,000 24,000
16,800 6,000
42,000 Sales
(1,500) Bad Debt Exp
(11,000) COGS
(8,000) Misc Exp
(1,000) Ins Exp
(2,000) Int Exp
(5,568) Tax Exp
(346) Bdg oprting exp
177 Int on cash
(100) Loss on sale
(1,000) Depr Exp Mach
(600) Depr Exp Building
(18) Cost amort
(205) Depr Exp
(500) Amort of patent
(3,000) cash dividends
2000 2000 (4,000) stock dividends
(1,800) 34,000 18,800 9,341
Discounted Free Cash Flo Aaysis:
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A
"g" 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
EBIT 5% 18,109 19,014 19,965 20,963 22,011 23,112 24,268 25,481 26,755 28,093 29,497
Taxes: 35% 6,338 6,655 6,988 7,337 7,704 8,089 8,494 8,918 9,364 9,832 10,324
EBIT (1-t) 11,771 12,359 12,977 13,626 14,307 15,023 15,774 16,563 17,391 18,260 19,173
Depreciation 3% -2,305 -2,374 -2,445 -2,519 -2,594 -2,672 -2,752 -2,835 -2,920 -3,007 -3,098
PPE 3% 58,000 68,583 70,641 72,760 74,943 77,191 79,507 81,892 84,349 86,879 89,486 92,170
APPE 10,583 2,058 2,119 2,183 2,248 2,316 2,385 2,457 2,530 2,606 2,685
CAPX 8,279 -316 -326 -336 -346 -356 -367 -378 -389 -401 -413
Net A/R 3% 9,000 12,000 12,360 12,731 13,113 13,506 13,911 14,329 14,758 15,201 15,657 16,127
Inventory 3% 3,000 7,000 7,210 7,426 7,649 7,879 8,115 8,358 8,609 8,867 9,133 9,407
A/P 3% 8,000 8,500 8,755 9,018 9,288 9,567 9,854 10,149 10,454 10,768 11,091 11,423
Other C/Liab 3% 2,000 2,068 2,130 2,194 2,260 2,328 2,397 2,469 2,543 2,620 2,698 2,779
NWC 2,000 8,432 8,685 8,945 9,214 9,490 9,775 10,068 10,370 10,681 11,002 11,332
ANWC 6,432 253 261 268 276 285 293 302 311 320 330
Free Cash Flow -5,245 10,049 10,597 11,175 11,783 12,422 13,095 13,804 14,549 15,333 16,159
Terminal value (end 2009) @ 10% 161,586
Assume ABC cost of capital 15.0%
Market Value @ Dec 2000 $5,043
Market 
Value:
ABC Enterprises Inc. - Impact of a Leverage Acquisition on Consolidated Financial Statements
Balance Sheet Equation:
;h A/R - ADA INV PPINS Land Machinery -Acc Dep Bdg -Acc Dep Patent
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5,521
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2,500
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2000
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474 Int on cash
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(1,000) Depr Exp Mach
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Market Value: Discounted Free Cash Flow Analysis:
"g" 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
EBIT 5% 18,399 19,319 20,285 21,299 22,364 23,482 24,656 25,889 27,183 28,543 29,970
Taxes: 35% 6,440 6,762 7,100 7,455 7,827 8,219 8,630 9,061 9,514 9,990 10,489
EBIT (1-t) 11,959 12,557 13,185 13,844 14,537 15,263 16,027 16,828 17,669 18,553 19,480
Depreciation 3% -2,305 -2,374 -2,445 -2,519 -2,594 -2,672 -2,752 -2,835 -2,920 -3,007 -3,098
PPE 3% 58,000 68,647 70,706 72,827 75,012 77,263 79,580 81,968 84,427 86,960 89,568 92,256
APPE 10,647 2,059 2,121 2,185 2,250 2,318 2,387 2,459 2,533 2,609 2,687
CAPX 8,342 -315 -324 -334 -344 -354 -365 -376 -387 -399 -410
Net A/R 3% 9,000 12,000 12,360 12,731 13,113 13,506 13,911 14,329 14,758 15,201 15,657 16,127
Inventory 3% 3,000 7,000 7,210 7,426 7,649 7,879 8,115 8,358 8,609 8,867 9,133 9,407
A/P 3% 8,000 8,500 8,755 9,018 9,288 9,567 9,854 10,149 10,454 10,768 11,091 11,423
Other C/Liab 3% 2,000 2,021 2,082 2,145 2,209 2,275 2,343 2,414 2,486 2,561 2,638 2,717
NWC 2,000 8,479 8,733 8,995 9,265 9,543 9,829 10,124 10,428 10,740 11,063 11,394
ANWC 6,479 254 262 270 278 286 295 304 313 322 332
Free Cash Flow -5,166 10,243 10,802 11,390 12,008 12,659 13,344 14,065 14,824 15,622 16,461
Terminal value (end 2009) @10% 164,614
Assume ABC cost of capital = 15.0%
Market Value @ Dec 2000 $5,311
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ABC Enterprises Inc. - Impact of a Synthetic Lease on Consolidated Financial Statements
Balance Sheet Equation:
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Market Value: Discounted Free Cash Flow Analysis:
"ign 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
EBIT 5% 18,293 19,208 20,168 21,177 22,236 23,347 24,515 25,741 27,028 28,379 29,798
Taxes: 35% 6,403 6,723 7,059 7,412 7,782 8,172 8,580 9,009 9,460 9,933 10,429
EBIT (1-t) 11,891 12,485 13,109 13,765 14,453 15,176 15,935 16,731 17,568 18,446 19,369
Depreciation 3% -2,100 -2,163 -2,228 -2,295 -2,364 -2,434 -2,508 -2,583 -2,660 -2,740 -2,822
PPE 3% 58,000 59,625 61,414 63,256 65,154 67,108 69,122 71,195 73,331 75,531 77,797 80,131
APPE 1,625 1,789 1,842 1,898 1,955 2,013 2,074 2,136 2,200 2,266 2,334
CAPX -475 -374 -385 -397 -409 -421 -434 -447 -460 -474 -488
Net A/R 3% 9,000 12,000 12,360 12,731 13,113 13,506 13,911 14,329 14,758 15,201 15,657 16,127
Inventory 3% 3,000 7,000 7,210 7,426 7,649 7,879 8,115 8,358 8,609 8,867 9,133 9,407
A/P 3% 8,000 8,500 8,755 9,018 9,288 9,567 9,854 10,149 10,454 10,768 11,091 11,423
Other C/Liab 3% 2,000 2,133 2,197 2,263 2,330 2,400 2,472 2,547 2,623 2,702 2,783 2,866
NWC 2,000 8,367 8,618 8,877 9,143 9,417 9,700 9,991 10,291 10,599 10,917 11,245
ANWC 6,367 251 259 266 274 283 291 300 309 318 328
Free Cash Flow 3,898 10,445 11,009 11,601 12,224 12,880 13,570 14,296 15,059 15,862 16,707
Terminal value (end 2009) @ 10% 167,072
Assume ABC cost of capital = 15.0%
Market Value @ Dec 2000 $13,484
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ABC Enterprises Inc. - Impact of a Bond Net Lease on Consolidated Financial Statements
Balance Sheet Equation:
Cash A/R - ADA INV PPINS Land Machinery - Acc Dep Bdg - Acc Dep Patent = A/P Acc/P Inc Tax/P Def Rent t Div/P Bonds/P - Disc B/P Corn Stock Add PI Cap RE
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Market Value: Discounted Free Cash Flow Analysis:
"g 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
EBIT 5% 17,469 18,342 19,259 20,222 21,233 22,295 23,410 24,580 25,809 27,100 28,455
Taxes: 35% 6,114 6,420 6,741 7,078 7,432 7,803 8,193 8,603 9,033 9,485 9,959
EBIT (1-t) 11,355 11,922 12,519 13,145 13,802 14,492 15,216 15,977 16,776 17,615 18,496
Depreciation 3% -2,100 -2,163 -2,228 -2,295 -2,364 -2,434 -2,508 -2,583 -2,660 -2,740 -2,822
PPE 3% 58,000 59,625 61,414 63,256 65,154 67,108 69,122 71,195 73,331 75,531 77,797 80,131
APPE 1,625 1,789 1,842 1,898 1,955 2,013 2,074 2,136 2,200 2,266 2,334
CAPX -475 -374 -385 -397 -409 -421 -434 -447 -460 -474 -488
Net A/R 3% 9,000 12,000 12,360 12,731 13,113 13,506 13,911 14,329 14,758 15,201 15,657 16,127
Inventory 3% 3,000 7,000 7,210 7,426 7,649 7,879 8,115 8,358 8,609 8,867 9,133 9,407
A/P 3% 8,000 8,500 8,755 9,018 9,288 9,567 9,854 10,149 10,454 10,768 11,091 11,423
Other C/Liab 3% 2,000 1,844 1,899 1,956 2,015 2,076 2,138 2,202 2,268 2,336 2,406 2,478
NWC 2,000 8,656 8,916 9,183 9,459 9,742 10,035 10,336 10,646 10,965 11,294 11,633
ANWC 6,656 260 267 275 284 292 301 310 319 329 339
Free Cash Flow 3,074 9,874 10,409 10,971 11,563 12,186 12,842 13,531 14,257 15,020 15,823
Terminal value (end 2009) @ 10% 158,229
Assume ABC cost of capital = 15.0%
Market Value @ Dec 2000 $12,178
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ABC Enterprises Inc. - Impact of a Traditional Operating Lease
Balance Sheet Equation:
on Consolidated Financial Statements
Cash A/R -ADA INV PPINS Land Machinery - Acc Dep Bdg - Acc Dep Patent = A/P Acc/P Inc Tax/P Def Rent L Div/P Bonds/P -Disc B/P Com Stock Add P-I Cap RE
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Market Value: Discounted Free Cash Flow Analysis:
"9" 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
EBIT 5% 17,344 18,211 19,121 20,078 21,081 22,135 23,242 24,404 25,625 26,906 28,251
Taxes: 35% 6,070 6,374 6,693 7,027 7,378 7,747 8,135 8,542 8,969 9,417 9,888
EBIT (1-t) 11,273 11,837 12,429 13,050 13,703 14,388 15,107 15,863 16,656 17,489 18,363
Depreciation 3% -2,100 -2,163 -2,228 -2,295 -2,364 -2,434 -2,508 -2,583 -2,660 -2,740 -2,822
PPE 3% 58,000 59,625 61,414 63,256 65,154 67,108 69,122 71,195 73,331 75,531 77,797 80,131
APPE 1,625 1,789 1,842 1,898 1,955 2,013 2,074 2,136 2,200 2,266 2,334
CAPX -475 -374 -385 -397 -409 -421 -434 -447 -460 -474 -488
Net A/R 3% 9,000 12,000 12,360 12,731 13,113 13,506 13,911 14,329 14,758 15,201 15,657 16,127
Inventory 3% 3,000 7,000 7,210 7,426 7,649 7,879 8,115 8,358 8,609 8,867 9,133 9,407
A/P 3% 8,000 8,500 8,755 9,018 9,288 9,567 9,854 10,149 10,454 10,768 11,091 11,423
Other C/Liab 3% 2,000 1,800 1,854 1,910 1,967 2,026 2,087 2,150 2,214 2,281 2,349 2,419
NWC 2,000 8,700 8,961 9,230 9,506 9,792 10,085 10,388 10,700 11,021 11,351 11,692
ANWC 6,700 261 269 277 285 294 303 312 321 331 341
Free Cash Flow 2,949 9,787 10,318 10,876 11,463 12,081 12,731 13,415 14,135 14,892 15,689
Terminal value (end 2009) @ 10% 156,888
Assume ABC cost of capital = 15.0%
Market Value @ Dec 2000 $11,980
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CASE STUDY PROTOCOL
1. Understanding the context:
The objective is to have a firm understanding of these issues before arriving on site. As preliminary discussion, this material will be
briefly covered in the interviews with various role players in the decision making process. Consensus should be reached in terms of
our understanding of these issues.
Overall corporate strategy:
" Consider the driving force: this determines the future product and market scope that define the business and provide a
framework for guiding operating decisions. This will provide the context to consider the linkage of corporate business strategy
to the real estate strategy.
" What is the primary driving force which provides the basis for defining all other choices related to your company's strategic
profile?
" What is the clear and simple concept that guides top management in developing their strategic framework?
* How do you see the competitive playing field in your industry? Who are your key competitors'? Are any of them new to the
industry?
" If asked by the shareholders, how would senior management describe the company's overall business strategy for remaining
profitable in the current competitive environment?
* Are there any documents that I can read in order to deepen my understanding of these issues?
* Consider the generic strategies employed to implement that driving force:
o Flow does your company position itself among your key competitors'? After response probe:
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- cost mimmization
- quality differentiation
- service leadership
* Consider the particular culture and values of the company
* Consider the competitive environment: Porter five forces
* What role does geography play in the business? Is the business defined by the markets in which it is located? (i.e. financial
services charted for a specific region) As opposed to a company whose product is more intangible and uninfluenced by
geographic considerations. If the company is a hybrid (service/manufacturing) where do the customers/suppliers fit into
location/facility decisions? Is proximity to customers and suppliers important?
* Consider the real estate requirements of primary business strategy?
* What is the CRE unit's key mandate within your company? How is your responsibility organized? (refer to both reporting and
accountability)
* Probe: roles in decision making process, property types covered, geographic reach.
o What specific contributions does real estate make as an input to production and service delivery function of the
business'?
" Do contributions vary by key business unit/customer market? By geographic market?
C What performance measures are used to assess your units contribution to the overall business value?
o Has either your mandate or the performance measures changed in recent years? If so, what precipitated those changes?
* Is real estate central to the distribution of the company's products'? Is it ancillary?
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* How important is interpersonal interaction between workers with the organization? Is interaction critical - thus proximity
important?
* What message does the company want to send by the image, external appearance, and internal ambiance of its space to
employees, suppliers, capital markets and the broader community in which the business is based?
The particular strategy that the enterprise elects to pursue will obviously determine what resources will be required to
implement that strategy. What is more important, however is how substantial the real estate/workplace investment is and
whether this is a part of a deliberate strategy linked to anticipated business value'?
Corporate real estate strategy:
* Does your company have an explicit strategy?
* Is the real estate strategy consistent with reinforcing the corporate strategy?
" What is the driving force in formulating the strategy? i.e. occupancy to cost minimization, flexibility, facilitation of operations,
production, service delivery?
* Consider the organizational demands? i.e. structural demands, cultural demands & internal financing demands.
* What factors exist outside the direct control of the company which affect the time horizon, functional requirements, and
resources available to plan and occupy space'?
* What sort of dialogue exists between the business strategic planning functions and corporate real estate planning?
* What factors/environmental constraints impact the ability of the company to make the long-term logistical and financial
commitments inherent in real estate and facility management decisions? i.e. product life cycles, the regulatory environment,
and financial resources.
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* What are the objectives of the real estate strategy? Consider:
o Cash generation,
o Takeover prevention
o More effective use of tax laws
o The use of real estate financing as a market signal
o Speculating in the local real estate markets by relying on the comparative advantage generated by the corporation's
long-time horizon
o Maintaining flexibility given the firm's current and expected space needs.
o Does the strategy primarily relate to business unit requirements? i.e. cost competitiveness, worker requirements, cycle
time for delivering space, innovation in terms of location and design?
* Is the corporate real estate team an integral part of the capacity planning process? Or do they typically just receive a mandate
requesting certain space requirements? To the business unit:
o Does your unit operate on the basis of a strategic plan'?
o Who has input into the plan?
o What data is incorporated into the plan?
o I low predictable are the needs of the business units?
o How does your plan take into account the lack of predictability?
o Who signs off on it?
o Notwithstanding the plan, are there times that business units do a great deal of legwork on their own in advance of
coming to the CRE unit?
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As context consider how operating decisions are made within the company. This will then form a basis for discussion leading into the
establishment of the key drivers in the financial structuring decision.
Real estate operating decisions:
Of critical strategic concern for the real estate function is then the implementation of operating decisions in a way that corresponds to
the enterprise's real estate strategy. These decisions will concern the process of acquiring, controlling, managing and disposing of real
property interests.
* What are the issues considered in making the operating (space need) decision? For instance these may include:
o Location, quantity, building size & character,
o Identity, signage, exterior quality,
o General building amenities, mechanical systems, information/communication systems,
o Local market conditions concerning relative availability of the quantity, pricing and type of space the company may
need
* Who are the key players in the capacity planning process? (HR, IT, Business Unit & CRE) Does your unit collaborate with IT,
IR'? How specifically does this occur? Part of planning/project driven? Part of the investment decision only?
It would help me if you could walk me through a couple of recent decisions. First, are there some facility decisions that are fairly
routine? Are the operating decisions process driven? Explain.
* What would be different in a situation where the facility is more complex due to the work processes, timing of delivery, or
other key factors?
* Is confirmation made that the operating decision is consistent with other critical component strategies such as finance, business
unit operations, HR etc.? Who needs to sign off on the final decision'?
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* The operating decision making process.....How does this compare to what has been the typical sequence of events:
1. The corporation decides on a need for additional space. This is usually part of a larger capital budgeting decision tied to
operations. Consider roles played by non-core functions in capacity planning process:
- Business units: FTE forecasts by function from business unit, preferred/required locations.
- Human resources: available labor market capacity by function in existing or new city/region.
- Treasury: financing capacity/constraints.
2. The space need is passed onto the corporation's real estate group for implementation.
- Corporate real estate:
Available physical and IT infrastructure capacity of existing facilities.
Available alternatives in existing or new city/region
Required cycle time for delivery of next increment of capacity.
3. Once the space need has been determined, major builder/developers and/or real estate professionals are contacted about the
need, and some subset of these professionals is hired to perform their services. This involves the selection of the optimal
financing structure, which typically involves an investment decision (via DCF), with a focus on flexibility, financial
reporting, risk management and other drivers as mentioned. The team the selects a Financing alternative which best meets
all stated objectives and considerations.
4. The real estate in entered into the firm's balance sheet and then often largely ignored. Consider lifecycle impacts of own-
lease spectrum
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Is this operating decision considered separate from the related financing decision?
Once the actual operating/space need decision is made, the specific asset identified now focus on the selection of a financial
structuring alternative:
2. Establishing the financing spectrum:
Fundamental question: given often inconsistent financial parameters and business unit demands, how did the decision making team
identify the best financing option?
Through preliminary calls establish:
* Who was involved in this financing decision making process?
* What is their position in the organizational structure?
* Assuming the financing decision was considered together with the operating decision, were the same key role players
involved? i.e. real estate manager, business unit, treasury team?
Arrange separate discussions with the various role players. Possibly speak to: CFO, treasurer, business unit leader, corporate real
estate manager. Discussion will then be held separately as a means to triangulate the information which is received. Use will be made
of the conceptual diagram as a basis for the discussion.
For each role player:
* Review the list of financing alternatives. First, establish the spectrum of financing options wihich are actively considered:
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o How do your business objectives vary by alternative?
o How are these alternatives functionally perceived by the corporation? i.e. I have viewed them primarily as a way to
control/mitigate the risk which is transferred to the corporate user. There are certainly many ways in which the
alternatives can be perceived, for instance they may be seen simply as differing degrees of control. What is you
perspective on this issue?
* What percentage of your portfolio is owned, leased, or controlled via other synthetic alternatives?
* Is there a tendency to own or lease?
* Is there any overriding driver considered in determining the financing alternative of choice. For instance - for some
companies, the decision appears to be a simple issue of determining whether the asset is core or non-core.
3. Considering the financing decision drivers:
1 am hoping that we can be fairly specific about what drives your real estate financing decisions.
Present conceptual diagram and ask them briefly to each fill in the major decision drivers that they consider.
* Please outline some of the major drivers that arc considered in the financing debate?
* Present my checklist of drivers and clarify/discuss the meaning of the drivers while confirming them.
* How are the drivers identified? Has there been, or is there an ongoing discussion which is held in reviewing and identifying
specific drivers'?
* Are they grouped in anyway? For instance, quantitative vs qualitative? Or real estate requirements, business user
needs/variability and investor risk reward objectives?
* Is there a formal approach to assessing the impact of the drivers?
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* How/why does the relationship between the drivers/financing alternatives vary by project? Which specific variables tend to be
considered in this case.
Consider the relative importance of the drivers:
* What specific drivers do you deem to be most important in making the financing decision?
o Why is this most important? Assuming this is a driver that I have identified, reference with my understanding of the
issue. Discuss.
o Did other role players in the decision making process also emphasize this drivers importance?
o If not - in your eyes, what issues/motivations were they concerned about and why? This will be a good way to again
assess the mutual understanding that the role players had of each others needs.
o How was the relative importance of the drivers assessed? Do you have a formal model for assessing this? If so, how
does it work?
* Flexibility is often mentioned as a key consideration. What does "flexibility" mean to you in this context? Is owning or leasing
more flexible from your point of view? Why?
* Depending on the response received in the above question: Do you distinguish between "control" and "flexibility"?
* Since treasury professionals are most familiar with corporate level capital sourcing and often have little expertise in real estate
funding, does the corporate real estate manager have direct access to capital sources?
0 In placing a quantifiable monetary value on the wide variety of financing options available, how is the project considered:
o Financing of an asset that will be discounted at an after-tax cost of debt?
o A project to be discounted at the weighted average cost of capital?
o Does this depend on the specific financing alternative being considered?
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* Do you believe that ownership of real estate assets directly alters the risk inherent in a compan's cash flows'? i.e. should cash
flows from a company owning a significant amount of real estate be discounted at a lower cost of capital?
* Should companies be disgorging their real estate assets and focusing on their core competency? Is this an issue which you
consider?
* How does your corporation think about risk? Do you have a formal approach in assessing the risks which the corporation will
be exposing itself to?
* Are the market value implications of the decision considered?
* What rationale/analysis do you require before you will decide whether a real estate investment has merit'? How does the
financing decision factor into you decisions?
* Has the company developed a "stock"/"one size fits all" approach that typically results in a single answer or decision for all
properties of particular type?
* What relevant information is gathered in order to evaluate the pros and cons of the full range of financial structures?
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